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The Red and Blue Golden State:  Why 
California’s Proposition 11 Will Not Produce 
More Competitive Elections 
Anthony E. Chavez* 
INTRODUCTION 
In November 2008, Californians approved a redistricting 
reform measure, Proposition 11, which, despite the promises of 
its supporters, will have little effect on the competitiveness of the 
state’s elections.1  The initiative shifted responsibility for the 
redrawing of state legislative lines from the Legislature to an 
appointed commission.2  Supporters promised that by taking the 
process from self-interested legislators, the resulting districts 
would be more competitive.  However, an analysis of the state’s 
demographics and the experience of other states suggests that a 
significant increase in the competitiveness of California’s 
legislative districts remains unlikely and may even be 
undesirable.  Indeed, because of the give-and-take nature of the 
redistricting process, California would be served best by keeping 
the initial responsibility for redrawing legislative lines with the 
Legislature.  A redistricting commission would be most helpful if 
it focused on reviewing and revising plans developed by the 
Legislature, rather than actually drawing the initial plan itself. 
This article first reviews the legal standards applicable to 
redistricting in California.  It then discusses the most recent 
redistrictings and the five failed attempts that have been made 
to alter the redistricting process through ballot initiatives.  
Section II addresses Proposition 11, the campaign, and the 2008 
general election.  Section III explores the benefits and detriments 
resulting from more competitive district elections, the much-
touted benefit of Proposition 11.  Section IV analyzes the decline 
 
* Assistant Professor, Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University.  The 
author is grateful for the advice and contributions of Matthias A. Jaren and Joaquin G. 
Avila and for the research assistance of Michelle Hugard and Kathryn Mattingly.  
Participants at the Washington University workshop also provided valuable input, and 
special appreciation is due to Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff for organizing it. 
 1 The full text of Proposition 11, as it appeared on the 2008 ballot, is available at 
http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposed-
laws.pdf#prop11 (last visited Nov. 2, 2010). 
 2 See infra Part II. 
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in competitive elections in California and the non-redistricting 
causes of this decline.  Section V looks to the experiences of other 
states that have employed commissions and imposed 
competitiveness standards on the drawing of their legislative 
districts.  Finally, the last two sections discuss the likelihood that 
Proposition 11’s redistricting commission will be able to draw 
more competitive districts and present an alternative approach 
that would provide redistricting roles for both an independent 
commission and the Legislature. 
I.  REDISTRICTING, “CALIFORNIA” STYLE 
Proposition 11 is the first successful salvo in the ongoing 
redistricting battle in California.3  To best appreciate the 
measure’s significance, a review of the state’s redistricting 
history is helpful.  But, first, this article will look at the legal 
constraints impacting redistricting prior to the passage of the 
measure.  Then, it will review the decline in competitiveness in 
California’s district elections which has prompted most of the 
concern over redistricting reform.  Moreover, the article will 
examine the battles over the state’s past redistrictings, both in 
the courts and on the ballot. 
A. Legal Constraints on Redistricting in California 
Redistricting is the process of revising the geographic 
boundaries of congressional or state legislative districts to 
account for population shifts between decennial censuses.4  The 
U.S. Constitution requires the federal government to conduct a 
census every ten years for the purpose of apportioning 
congressional seats among the states.5  The states typically 
 
 3 Two years later, California voters approved Proposition 20, which extends the 
reach of Proposition 11 to encompass the redrawing of congressional districts. See 
Proposition 20: Voter Information Guide, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, 
http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/propositions/20/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2010).  In the 
November 2010 election, California’s voters also rejected Proposition 27, which would 
have repealed Proposition 11. See Proposition 27: Voter Information Guide, CALIFORNIA 
SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/propositions/27/ (last visited Dec. 
28, 2010). 
 4 What You Should Know About the Apportionment Counts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(2000), http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/pio00-ac.pdf.  Redistricting is distinct from 
apportionment, which is the process of determining the number of seats to which each 
state is entitled in the U.S. House of Representatives. Id. 
 5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.  Article I provides that the first census shall occur 
within three years of the first meeting of congress; it further requires that the federal 
government conduct future censuses within ten-year terms thereafter. Id.  Now, “Census 
Day” is the first day of April in years ending in zero. Key Dates—2010 Census, 2010 
CENSUS, http://2010.census.gov/2010census/how/key-dates.php (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).  
Within one week of the commencement of the Congress following the census, the 
President must transmit to Congress a statement of the persons counted in each state and 
its allocation of Representatives. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (2006). 
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redistrict their own state legislatures in conjunction with this 
process.  The California State Constitution, for instance, requires 
that the state redistrict its election lines once every decade in the 
year following the national census.6  Historically, the California 
Assembly has shouldered responsibility for redrawing state 
legislative and congressional district lines.7 
Certain federal and state standards apply to the drawing of 
election districts.  First, the Supreme Court has determined that 
congressional districts must have approximately equal 
population.  In Reynolds v. Sims,8 the Court held that political 
equality under the Constitution “can mean only one thing—one 
person, one vote.”9  This means that district populations should 
be as nearly equal as possible.10  Courts have applied this 
standard rigorously in congressional redistrictings.11  In the 
context of state legislative plans, the Supreme Court has allowed 
state legislatures greater latitude.12  Indeed, the Court has 
indicated that deviations of at least sixteen percent are 
acceptable.13 
The other federal law that controls redistricting is the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 (Act), as amended and codified in Title 42 of 
the United States Code.14  Depending upon the state involved, 
two provisions of the Act may have implications for redistricting.  
Section 2 of the Act applies to all states.15  Where certain 
preconditions exist,16 section 2 prohibits dilution of minority 
 
 6 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, §§ 1–2. 
 7 § 1 (amended 1980). 
 8 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 9 Id. at 558 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1962)). 
 10 To calculate the ideal district population, divide the state’s total population by the 
number of districts in the legislative body. THOMAS L. BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND 
REPRESENTATION: WHY COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS ARE BAD FOR AMERICA 54 (2008).  The 
variance of a given district is the total population of a district divided by the ideal district 
size.  The overall or total deviation of a plan is the population difference between the 
largest and smallest districts divided by the ideal district population. Chapter 3—Equal 
Protection, MINN. SENATE, http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/ 
Red2000/Ch2Equal.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 11 See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1969) (“[T]he ‘as nearly as 
practicable’ standard requires that the State make a good-faith effort to achieve precise 
mathematical equality.”). 
 12 See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 326 (1973). 
 13 Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 161–62 (1993) (stating that Mahan upheld a 
sixteen percent deviation because it was justified by a rational objective). 
 14 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971–1974 (2006). 
 15 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). 
 16 The Supreme Court has identified three preconditions that must be present to 
establish a violation of section 2.  First, the minority group must be sufficiently large and 
geographically compact so as to constitute a majority in a district.  Second, it must be 
politically cohesive.  Third, the white majority must vote sufficiently as a bloc to enable it 
to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 
(1986). 
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voting strength.17  Line drawers typically use one or more of the 
following techniques to dilute minority voting strength through 
redistricting: “packing,” “cracking,” or “stacking.”  “Packing” 
involves concentrating as many minorities as possible into as few 
districts as possible, thereby creating larger minority populations 
than necessary to elect their candidates of choice and minimizing 
the impact of minority votes.18  “Cracking” consists of splitting 
concentrations of a minority population and dispersing them 
among other districts to increase the number of districts 
containing white-voting majorities.19  Finally, “stacking” refers to 
combining concentrations of a minority population with larger 
concentrations of a white population to ensure that the districts 
contain white voting majorities.20 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires that changes 
involving voting (such as the passage of a redistricting plan) 
must be approved (“precleared”) by either the U.S. Attorney 
General or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.21  
Section 5 prohibits “retrogression in the position of racial 
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral 
franchise.”22  Section 5 extends only to nine states in their 
entirety, and to portions of seven others.23  Four counties in 
California fall under section 5.24  Section 5 applies when a 
covered jurisdiction adopts a redistricting plan.25  Because four 
counties in California are covered, the effects of any statewide 
redistricting plan (congressional or legislative) on those four 
counties fall within the preclearance requirement of section 5.26 
 
 17 Upon satisfaction of the three Gingles preconditions, courts must examine other 
factors in the totality of circumstances. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011–12 
(1994).  Those factors include: a history of official discrimination touching the right to 
vote; racially polarized voting; the use of election procedures that may enhance the 
opportunity for discrimination; the use of a candidate slating process; the extent to which 
members of the minority group bear the effects of nonvoting discrimination which hinder 
their ability to participate in the political process; the use of racial appeals in political 
campaigns; the election of minority group members to public office; a lack of 
responsiveness by elected officials to the needs of the minority group; the tenuousness of 
policies underlying voting procedures; and proportionality, defined as the relationship 
between the number of majority-minority voting districts and minority members’ share of 
the relevant population. Johnson v. Hamrick, 196 F.3d 1216, 1220 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 18 Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in 
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 85, 96 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1989). 
 19 Id. at 89. 
 20 Id. at 92. 
 21 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2006). 
 22 Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). 
 23 28 C.F.R. § 51 app. (2009). 
 24 The counties are Kings, Merced, Monterey, and Yuba. Id. 
 25 28 CFR § 51.13(e) (2009); Beer, 425 U.S. at 133. 
 26 Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 550 (Cal. 1992). 
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California law also imposes certain requirements upon the 
redistricting process.  The California Constitution sets forth 
several basic constraints.  It reiterates the federal requirement 
that the districts shall have reasonably equal population27 and 
also requires that they be contiguous.28  In addition, the 
California Constitution provides that the geographical integrity 
of cities and counties be respected to the extent possible, without 
violating other requirements.29 
In addition, California recently passed its own state voting 
rights act.30  While the California act is similar to the federal 
statute, the state law explicitly removes geographic concen-
tration of the minority group as a requirement for finding a 
violation.31  Of course, some level of geographic compactness is 
necessary to establish an interest in redistricting.  For these 
reasons, California’s voting rights act does not appear to create 
any new constraints on its redistricting process. 
B. Recent Trends in California District Elections 
Despite the tradition in California (and elsewhere) of 
legislative control of the redistricting process, the placement of 
this responsibility in the hands of the Legislature has long been a 
target of criticism.32  In general, critics have charged that 
legislators are inherently self-interested in the outcome of 
redistricting.33  Legislators have a number of incentives to exploit 
the process for political gain, including protection of individual 
incumbents, expanding partisan statewide majorities, and 
punishing those with differences from the line drawers, 
regardless of their party affiliation.34  Critics complain that 
“politicians get to choose their voters, rather than the 
 
 27 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1(b). 
 28 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(3). 
 29 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4). 
 30 CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 14025–32 (West 2009). 
 31 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14028(c) (West 2009). 
 32 See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, A Fighting Chance for Redistricting, L.A. TIMES, 
Sep. 27, 2008, at A21 [hereinafter Stephanopoulos, A Fighting Chance for Redistricting], 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/27/opinion/oe-stephanopoulis27. 
 33 Id. 
 34 George Passantino, Redistricting in California: Competitive Elections and the 
Effects of Proposition 11, REASON FOUNDATION 13 (Oct. 2008), http://reason.org/files/ 
79d00eb443669b026c8c37c483f0bdb0.pdf.  While these are recognized incentives for 
political gain through redistricting, they do not all lead to the same ultimate 
configuration.  For instance, the incentive of protecting individual incumbents encourages 
increasing a party’s concentration in a particular district.  Expanding a party’s statewide 
share of districts, however, often requires drawing slimmer margins in each individual 
district, as the plan spreads that party’s voters around to more districts. David Lublin & 
Michael P. McDonald, Is It Time to Draw the Line? The Impact of Redistricting on 
Competition in State House Elections, 5 ELECTION L.J. 144, 145 (2006). 
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reverse . . . .”35  Or, as North Carolina State Senator Mark 
McDaniel rather candidly admitted about the redistricting 
process, “We are in the business of rigging elections.”36 
While these arguments have tremendous emotional appeal, 
of greater interest is whether proof of such practices can be found 
in California.  Critics of legislative redistricting identify several 
indicia of these practices.  First, one trend pointed out by 
proponents of Proposition 11 during the 2008 campaign was the 
decline in changes of party control of California’s Assembly 
districts.37  Figure 1 tracks the number of seats in the Assembly 
that have changed parties between 1960 and 2010: 
FIGURE 138 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 Editorial, Redistricting Defeats, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2005, at A20. 
 36 John Hoeffel, Six Incumbents Are a Week Away from Easy Election, WINSTON-
SALEM J., Jan. 27, 1998, at B1. 
 37 See Passantino, supra note 34, at 13. 
 38 See Elected Offices, JOINCALIFORNIA, http://www.joincalifornia.com/page/9 (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2011).  Although data was available only through 2006 when Proposition 
11 appeared on the ballot, this Article will include data through the November 2010 
general election. 
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The first striking fact about this chart is the two spikes in 
the trendline.  These spikes represent a high exchange of seats 
between the parties in 1974 and 1992.  Both of these occurred in 
the first elections after the implementation of new redistricting 
plans.39  Of course, these are not the only elections held after the 
passage of new plans.  California conducted elections pursuant to 
new plans in 1962, 1982, and 2002.  Why were 1974 and 1992 the 
only years to have such extraordinarily high changes of seats 
between the major parties?  Possibly because the authors of those 
plans were judges and not the Legislature.40 
The other trend that Figure 1 highlights is the overall 
decline of party turnover during the period analyzed.  In the 
1960s, the yearly exchange of seats averaged eight per election.  
By the 2000s, the average turnover was down to less than two 
per election.  As was frequently noted during the Proposition 11 
campaign,41 in the two elections prior to the 2008 election, no 
Assembly seats changed party hands.42 
Another possible indicator of legislative misuse of the 
redistricting process is the decline in competitive elections.  
Scholars have noted the decline of marginal districts over the 
past thirty years.43  California’s elections have followed this 
pattern; the number of competitive assembly seats has steadily 
decreased.  For instance, Passantino tracked the number of  
 
 
 39 In the 1970s, because of an impasse between the legislature and Governor Reagan 
over the proposed redistricting plan, the California Supreme Court ordered that the state 
use a temporary plan for the 1972 elections.  The first election conducted under the 
permanent plan was in 1974. Legislature v. Reinecke, 492 P.2d 385, 390–91 (Cal. 1972); 
Legislature v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 9 (Cal. 1973). 
 40 See infra notes 51–53, 64–67 and accompanying text. 
 41 Stephanopoulos, A Fighting Chance for Redistricting, supra note 32. 
 42 See supra Figure 1.  Ironically, this trend took a brief respite in the same election 
in which the voters approved Proposition 11.  Five assembly seats changed party hands in 
November 2008.  By 2010, however, the pattern returned, as the parties swapped only one 
seat. See Figure 1. 
 43 Samuel Issacharoff & Jonathan Nagler, Protected from Politics: Diminishing 
Margins of Electoral Competition in U.S. Congressional Elections, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1121, 
1124–25 (2007) (showing a decline over the past sixty years in congressional elections 
decided by ten percent and five percent margins between the top two candidates). 
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assembly seats where the winner won no more than fifty-three 
percent of the vote.44  Figure 2 presents the results: 
FIGURE 245 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In many respects, Figure 2 presents a picture quite similar 
to that of Figure 1.  In both Figures 1 and 2, the highest peak 
occurs in 1974, which is immediately subsequent to the adoption 
of that year’s plans.  However, the second peak in Figure 1 occurs 
in 1992, but in Figure 2 it does not arise until 1996.  In other 
words, in the 1990s, the highest number of districts changed 
party hands in the year immediately after the redistricting, while 
the number of competitive contests continued to increase.  This 
discrepancy may suggest that factors other than redistricting 
affect competitiveness.  Although Figure 2 also suggests that the 
number of competitive districts had been in decline since the 
1992 redistricting, as with Figure 1, it illustrates a significant, 
though short-lived, rebound in the 2008 general election.46 
 
 44 Passantino, supra note 34 at 11–12. 
 45 See Elections by Decade, JOINCALIFORNIA, http://www.joincalifornia.com/page/10 
(last visited Jan. 4, 2011). 
 46 The fact that eight of the nine competitive districts in 2008 had Republican 
incumbents suggests that the rise in close contests may not reflect a general increase in 
competitiveness, but rather the national trend supporting Democratic candidates in that 
election. See generally Gary C. Jacobson, The 2008 Presidential and Congressional 
Elections: Anti-Bush Referendum and Prospects for the Democratic Majority, 124 POL. SCI. 
Q., no.1 (2009). 
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This decline in competitive districts during the past two 
decades coincided, not surprisingly, with the rise in sophisticated 
tools for the line drawers.  Indeed, the most significant change 
occurred between the 1981 and 1991 redistricting cycles.  For 
instance, the architect of California’s 1981 redistricting, 
Congressman Philip Burton, “used teams of individuals to 
analyze massive hard-copy reports of voter registration data, 
election results, census data, and precinct maps using simple 
calculators and colored markers.”47  One decade later, the 
available technology had changed dramatically.  The Supreme 
Court described the capabilities of the software REDAPPL, which 
the Texas redistricters used in 1991: 
REDAPPL permitted redistricters to manipulate district lines on 
computer maps, on which racial and other socioeconomic data were 
superimposed.  At each change in configuration of the district lines 
being drafted, REDAPPL displayed updated racial composition 
statistics for the district as drawn.  REDAPPL contained racial data 
at the block-by-block level, whereas other data, such as party 
registration and past voting statistics, were only available at the level 
of voter tabulation districts (which approximate election precincts).  
The availability and use of block-by-block racial data was 
unprecedented; before the 1990 census, data were not broken down 
beyond the census tract level.48 
Thus, redistricters who sought to minimize competitiveness 
suddenly found themselves armed with new, high-tech tools with 
which to accomplish this objective. 
C. California’s Redistrictings and Redistricting Ballot 
Initiatives 
In the past forty years, redistricting has been especially 
contentious in California.  Both the process and the resulting 
plans have been the targets of litigation and of ballot measures.  
These experiences helped to shape Proposition 11 and its 
successful campaign. 
 
 47 Micah Altman, Karin Mac Donald, & Michael McDonald, From Crayons to 
Computers: The Evolution of Computer Use in Redistricting, 23 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 
334, 336 (2005).  Because of the difficulty in using this data, Burton often relied upon his 
own knowledge of the state’s demography and voting patterns to assess proposed districts.  
Nevertheless, Burton was so knowledgeable that he was able to create a district plan that 
swung five congressional seats to the Democrats. Id. 
 48 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 961 (1996). 
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Three of California’s past four redistrictings were the 
subjects of litigation.  In 1971, the Democratic-controlled 
Legislature and Republican Governor Ronald Reagan failed to 
agree to a redistricting plan.49  Accordingly, the California 
Supreme Court adopted temporary redistricting plans for the 
1972 election.50  When the Legislature did not enact redistricting 
plans in 1972, the California Supreme Court appointed special 
masters to develop the plans,51 which it eventually adopted.52 
In 1981, the Democrat-controlled Legislature passed 
redistricting plans that Democratic Governor Jerry Brown 
signed.53  Republicans, outraged over what they thought was 
blatant partisan gerrymandering, commenced two separate 
attacks to overturn these plans.54  First, they placed three 
referenda on the June 1982 ballot; each proposition sought to 
replace one of the redistricting plans (assembly, senate, and 
congressional).55  Republicans hoped that new plans could take 
effect immediately, but the California Supreme Court ordered the 
state to use the 1981 plans for the 1982 congressional and 
legislative elections.56  The three plans used for the 1982 
elections each lost the referenda vote by an average margin of  
sixty-three percent to thirty-seven percent.57  Moreover, in 
 
 49 Passantino, supra note 34, at 3. 
 50 Legislature v. Reinecke, 492 P.2d 385, 390–91 (Cal. 1972). 
 51 Legislature v. Reinecke, 507 P.2d 626, 627–28 (Cal. 1973). 
 52 Legislature v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 9 (Cal. 1973). 
 53 Assembly v. Deukmejian, 639 P.2d 939, 942 (Cal. 1982). 
 54 Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular Initiatives to 
Establish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J. L. & POL. 331, 360 (2007) 
[hereinafter Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting].  Critics of the plans used colorful 
language to voice their objections: “One Republican denounced the Burton plan as an 
‘outrageous, blatant, partisan carving up of the people,’ another likened it to the Jewish 
Holocaust, while a third, adding one more insensitive religious metaphor, compared 
Speaker Brown to the contemporary Iranian theocrat, the Ayatollah Khomeini.” J. 
Morgan Kousser, Reapportionment Wars: Party, Race, and Redistricting in California, 
1971–1992, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990S, at 134, 153 (Bernard Grofman ed., 
1998).  For his part, Representative Burton, the architect of the plan, described a district 
that spanned the San Francisco Bay and four counties as “my contribution to modern art.” 
Daniel Borenstein, The California Experience: Why Most of the Media Ignored 
Redistricting, 1 ELECTION L.J. 141, 142 (2002). 
 55 Kousser, supra note 54.  Proposition 10 challenged the congressional plan; 
Proposition 11 sought to replace the state senate redistricting; and Proposition 12 
challenged the assembly remap. California 1982 Ballot Propositions, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California_1982_ballot_propositions (last visited Oct. 
23, 2010). 
 56 Assembly v. Deukmejian, 639 P.2d 939, 963. 
 57 Specifically, Proposition 10 lost 35.4% to 64.6%; Proposition 11 lost 37.8% to 
62.2%; and Proposition 12 lost 37.9% to 62.1%. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, 
STATEMENT OF VOTE: JUNE 8, 1982, GENERAL ELECTION (1982).  The wording of the 
propositions provided that a “‘yes’ vote approves, a ‘no’ vote rejects” the redistricting 
statutes involved.  Thus, a majority of “no” votes for a measure overturned the particular 
redistricting statute in question. Id. 
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November 1982, a Republican was elected to replace Governor 
Brown.58  Accordingly, the lame duck Democratic governor called 
a special session of the Legislature to commence in December 
1982, one month before Governor Brown was to step down, to 
develop new plans.59  The Democrats drew plans that offered 
sufficient protections to Republicans and garnered the necessary 
two-thirds vote to receive “urgency” status,60 which caused the 
plans to be sent to Governor Brown before the end of his term.61  
The new plans remained in effect through 1990.62  As a second 
means to overturn the Democrat’s plans, the Republicans placed 
onto the November 1982 ballot Proposition 14.63 
In 1991, Governor Pete Wilson vetoed the redistricting plans 
approved by the Legislature.64  Since the Legislature did not 
have sufficient votes to override the veto,65 the governor initiated 
mandate proceedings in the California Supreme Court.66  The 
court exercised its original jurisdiction and appointed three 
special masters, whom they instructed to develop the 
redistricting plans after conducting public hearings.67  The 
California court accepted and adopted the Special Masters’ 
recommendations with minor modifications.68  
Finally, in 2001, the Golden State avoided major litigation 
over its redistricting plan when Democratic and Republican 
leaders found common ground: preservation of incumbents.69  As 
 
 58 Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 666 (N.D. Cal. 1988). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Pursuant to the California Constitution, “urgency statutes” must be “necessary for 
immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety,” and passed by two thirds of 
each house. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d).  Moreover, as an urgency statute, the statute 
redistricting the state legislature was not subject to a referendum. Legislature v. 
Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 22 (Cal. 1983).  The statute establishing the state’s new 
congressional lines would have been subject to a referendum, but no one challenged it. Id. 
 61 Kousser, supra note 54, at 156. 
 62 Passantino, supra note 34, at 6. 
 63 See infra notes 76–84 and accompanying text. 
 64 Wilson v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1306, 1306 (Cal. 1991). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 1307. 
 68 Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 559 (Cal. 1992). 
 69 Later, the state’s Republicans revealed that they reached this accommodation 
after playing a “bluff” in 2001.  Because of the strong Democratic majorities in the 
legislature (twenty-six to fourteen in the Senate and fifty to thirty in the Assembly) and a 
Democrat, Gray Davis, occupying the governor’s mansion, Democrats could pass 
redistricting litigation without a single Republican vote.  Republicans threatened to 
submit the redistricting to a statewide referendum.  Actually, however, the state party 
had “absolutely no money for a referendum,” admitted then-Assembly Republican Jim 
Brulte. Jim Sanders, Precursor to Prop. 77 ‘Orchestrated Well’: Both Parties Got What 
They Wanted in 2001, at Least in the Short Term, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 19, 2005, at A3.  
Despite their ability to pass redistricting legislation and the likelihood that a referendum 
would not overturn the redistricting plans, Democrats accepted the deal.  Considerations 
for the Democrats included the ability to shore up several congressional seats won in 
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the Los Angeles Times characterized the plan: “Most legislative 
districts are so safe that the real battles are in the primary 
elections.”70  The Legislature drew both congressional and 
legislative lines “in a transparent effort to create ‘safe seats’ for 
virtually all state and federal legislators . . . .”71  Accordingly, the 
Democratic-controlled Legislature passed redistricting plans—
with no significant Republican opposition—that Democratic 
Governor Gray Davis signed.72  Critics have described those 
plans as “bipartisan gerrymanders”73 and “incumbent protection 
gerrymanders.”74 
 
2000, certainty over future district lines, and the concern that the Bush Administration 
might use the Voting Rights Act to challenge the plan. Id. 
 70 Editorial, Serving the Pols, Not the People, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, at B10.  An 
analysis of the plans demonstrates the successfulness of their agreement.  The following 
table presents the number of assembly and state senate districts before and after the 
redistricting that had registered voter differentials between Republicans and Democrats 
of five percentage points or less: 
 
TABLE 1 
DISTRICTS WITH 5% REGISTRATION DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS 
1992 AND 2002 REDISTRICTING PLANS 
 
 Pre-Redistricting Post-Redistricting 
Assembly 14 3 
State Senate 7 1 
 
Sanders, supra note 69.  Table 1 shows the significant drop in the number of competitive 
districts in both the Assembly and Senate after the redistricting. 
 71 Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality, 
and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2515 (2003). 
 72 Carl Ingram, Davis OKs Redistricting that Keeps Status Quo, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 28, 
2001, at B12. 
 73 Michael S. Kang, The Bright Side of Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 443, 464 (2005). 
 74 Lublin & McDonald, supra note 34, at 146.  Ironically, the ultimate consequence of 
the Democrats agreeing to the “bipartisan gerrymander” is that it prevented the heavily-
Democratic state from sharing in the Democratic electoral wave in 2006 and 2008. See 
Dan Morain, Donors Give Millions, Hide Their Motives, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 18, 2010, 
at E1. 
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Just as California’s redistricting plans have been hotly 
contested, so has its redistricting process; redistricting has been 
the subject of five California propositions since the 1980s.75  The 
first four failed by significant margins.  The fifth finally 
succeeded, but by less than two percentage points. 
Proposition 14 appeared on the November 1982 ballot.76  It 
sought to create a redistricting commission whose members 
would be selected by judges, the major parties, and by any other 
party representing at least ten percent of the Legislature.77  
California Republicans were the primary financial supporters of 
the proposition, and several interest groups also backed it.78  The 
Democratic Party and its leaders, especially Governor Jerry 
Brown and Assembly Speaker Willie Brown, were its primary 
opponents.79  The proposition lost by a vote of 44.5% to 54.5%.80 
After the defeat of Proposition 14 and the subsequent 
blocking of the Sebastiani Plan, the Republicans, under the 
stewardship of Governor Deukmejian, developed a new proposal 
which became Proposition 39 on the November 1984 ballot.81  
This measure proposed to establish a redistricting commission 
with eight of its ten members consisting of retired state court 
judges.82  Both parties spent approximately $4 million on the 
 
 75 The California Supreme Court blocked two additional proposals from being 
submitted to the voters.  Assemblyman Don Sebastiani (heir to the wine fortune) and 
several Republican campaign consultants (still angry from the loss of potential fees that 
would have resulted from another round of competitive elections under new redistricting 
plans) prepared another referendum for a December 1983 special election.  The proposed 
statutes would redraw the congressional and state legislative districts. Kousser, supra 
note 54, at 156.  Collectively, they were dubbed the “Sebastiani Plan.” Alan Heslop, 
REDISTRICTING REFORM IN CALIFORNIA 2 (2004), http://www.claremontmckenna.edu/rose/ 
publications/pdf/conf_redistricting_paper.pdf.  The state legislature and several 
Democratic officeholders petitioned the California Supreme Court to prevent the holding 
of the special election. Legislature v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 18 (1982).  The court ruled 
that the state could only be redistricted once per decade. Id. at 22.  The court also said 
that the holding of the special election was prevented. Id. at 31.  Two decades later, 
Proposition 24, a proposal intended for the March 2000 ballot, would have transferred 
responsibility for drafting redistricting plans from the state legislature to the California 
Supreme Court, which would then appoint a panel of special masters to conduct hearings 
and prepare the actual plans. Senate v. Jones, 988 P.2d 1089, 1092–93 (Cal. 1999).  
Because the measure violated a requirement that propositions must involve only a single 
subject (it also included provisions relating to the compensation of state legislators and 
other officers), the state’s highest court blocked the proposal from appearing on the ballot. 
Id. at 1105. 
 76 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 77 Heslop, supra note 75, at 1. 
 78 Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting, supra note 54, at 361. 
 79 Id. at 361–62. 
 80 Passantino, supra note 34, at 6. 
 81 Kousser, supra note 54, at 157–58. 
 82 Heslop, supra note 75, at 2. 
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campaign.83  Nevertheless, Proposition 39 lost by a similar 
margin to that of Proposition 14, 44.8% in favor versus 55.2% 
against.84 
Having failed in the court of public opinion, the Republicans 
shifted their efforts to actual courts.  However, they had no 
greater success.85  Thus, in anticipation of the post-1990 Census 
redistricting, Republicans placed two propositions onto the June 
1990 ballot.86  The first, Proposition 118, would have retained 
initial authority over redistricting in the Legislature, but for such 
plans to become law it would have required that the redistricting 
plans receive two-thirds of the votes in each chamber, the 
signature of the governor, and approval by the voters in a 
referendum.87  Proposition 119, submitted by a second group of 
Republicans, would have replaced the Legislature with a 
bipartisan commission whose members were nominated by non-
profit, non-partisan organizations and selected by a panel of 
retired judges.88  Supporters again contributed millions to the 
campaigns.89  Proposition 118 failed by approximately 33% to 
67%, while Proposition 119 lost by a vote of approximately 36% to 
64%.90 
Finally, in 2005, after becoming frustrated by working  
with the Democratic-controlled state Legislature, Republican 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger made redistricting reform one 
of his primary goals.91  He ordered a special election in 2005.92  
Included on the ballot was Proposition 77, which would have 
created a three-member commission to conduct the 
redistricting.93  Proposition 77, along with the eight other 
 
 83 Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting, supra note 54, at 363–64. 
 84 Heslop, supra note 75, at 3. 
 85 See Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 666 (N.D. Cal. 1988).  In Badham, 
Republican Congressional representatives and voters challenged the redistricting bill 
signed by Governor Brown in 1983 as an “intentional, invidious and effective 
gerrymander” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 667.  The three judge 
panel granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiffs could not amend their 
complaint to state a claim under Davis v. Bandemer. Id. at 673 (referring to Davis v. 
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)). 
 86 Kousser, supra note 54, at 165. 
 87 Heslop, supra note 75, at 3. 
 88 Kousser, supra note 54, at 166; Heslop, supra note 75, at 4.  If both propositions 
passed, the measure that received the largest majority would prevail. Kousser, supra note 
54, at 166. 
 89 One estimate calculated that the campaigns for and against the measure received 
a combined total of $6 million. Kousser, supra note 54, at 166. 
 90 Heslop, supra note 75, at 5. 
 91 Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting, supra note 54, at 372. 
 92 Proclamation, Governor Schwarzenegger Proclaims Special Election for November 
8, 2005, OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR (June 13, 2005), http://gov.ca.gov/proclamation/2064/. 
 93 Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting, supra note 54, at 372.  Proposition 77 
was just one part of a reform agenda for which the governor sought approval from the 
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propositions on the ballot, lost; Proposition 77 failing by a vote of 
40.5% in favor to 59.5% against.94 
Thus, the five propositions after Baker v. Carr that were 
submitted to California voters lost.  Table 2 summarizes these 
results: 
TABLE 2 
REDISTRICTING PROPOSITIONS 
1982–2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Support for these propositions never reached 45%.  
Consequently, each proposition lost by a double-digit margin, 
with an average differential of 20.2%. 
With this as the background leading up to the 2008 election, 
Proposition 11 qualified for the November 2008 ballot. 
II.  PROPOSITION 11:  IF AT FIRST YOU DON’T SUCCEED . . . 
In many ways, the passage of Proposition 11 in 2008 was 
aberrational.  Most things about the contest were unusual, 
including its inception, fundraising, and support.  Nevertheless, 
despite the benefit of all of these factors, it still nearly did not 
pass.95 
 
voters.  He also included on the ballot propositions that would delay teachers from 
gaining tenure (Proposition 74), require employee consent to use union dues for political 
contributions (Proposition 75), and limit increases in state spending (Proposition 76). 
Jordan Rau, Governor Puts Agenda on Ballot, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at A1; 
California Special Election, 2005, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_ 
special_election,_2005 (last visited Oct. 5, 2010). 
 94 Peter Nicholas & Jordan Rau, Results Unsettle Gov.'s Supporters, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 10, 2005, at A1.  All of Governor Schwarzenegger’s measures lost despite his raising 
and spending $56 million on them.  The total spent for all of the propositions in that 
election reached $300 million. Richard L. Hasen, Assessing California’s Hybrid 
Democracy, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1501, 1502 (2009). 
 95 CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4, 2008, 
GENERAL ELECTION 7 (2008) [hereinafter STATEMENT OF VOTE 2008], available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/sov_complete.pdf. 
Year Measure For Against Difference
1982 Proposition 14 44.5 54.5 -10.0
1984 Proposition 39 44.8 55.2 -10.4
1990 Proposition 118 33.0 67.0 -34.0
1990 Proposition 119 36.2 63.8 -27.6
2005 Proposition 77 40.5 59.5 -19.0
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During the post mortem of the 2005 special election, one 
critique found that Governor Schwarzenegger “took on too much.  
He took on everybody in sight.”96  Accordingly, in 2008 he 
narrowed his focus to one target: redistricting. 
Perhaps more importantly, as in any good sequel, several 
new actors joined Schwarzenegger.  One factor that set 
Proposition 11 apart from its predecessors was the breadth of its 
conception and subsequent support.  The proposal arose not from  
one of the political parties or the governor, but from the efforts of 
“good government” non-profit organizations—the drafters of the 
measure included the California branches of AARP, Common 
Cause, and the League of Women Voters.97  The authors of the 
ballot arguments were the presidents of the California Taxpayers 
Association and the California offices of the League of Women 
Voters and AARP.98  In addition to these organizations, 
proponents of the measure included the Los Angeles Chamber of 
Commerce, the California Chamber of Commerce, the California 
NAACP, the California Police Chiefs Association, and the ACLU 
of Southern California.99  The proposition also received 
endorsements from a broad range of editorial boards.100 
Politically, the supporters of Proposition 11 were similarly 
diverse.  Despite its non-profit roots, the measure became 
identified with Republican Governor Schwarzenegger.101  This 
occurred for good reason since he was an active campaigner and 
 
 96 Nicholas & Rau, supra note 94. 
 97 Kathay Feng, Executive Director, Common Cause, Gov. Schwarzenegger Touts 
Redistricting Reform, Highlights Continued Fight for Reform in California (Dec. 17, 
2008), http://gov38.ca.gov/index.php?/speech/11278/. 
 98 California Online Voter Guide—2008 General Election, CAL. VOTER FOUND., 
http://www.calvoter.org/voter/elections/2008/general/props/prop11.html (last visited Oct. 
23, 2010). 
 99 California Passes Proposition 11 on Redistricting Reform, AMERICANS FOR 
REDISTRICTING REFORM, http://www.americansforredistrictingreform.org/documents/ 
Proposition11.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).  Organizations with a particular focus on 
the interests of California’s minority populations, however, largely opposed Proposition 
11.  Opponents included the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed 
Officials, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund, and the Asian Pacific American Legal Center. Id. 
 100 Included among the papers to endorse the measure were the Los Angeles Times, 
San Francisco Chronicle, San Jose Mercury News, Fresno Bee, Torrance Daily Breeze, San 
Diego Union Tribune, Pasadena Now, L.A. Daily News, North County Times, Stockton 
Record, San Gabriel Valley Tribune, Santa Cruz Sentinel, Lompoc Record, and Redding 
Searchlight. California Proposition 11 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://www.ballotpedia.org/ 
wiki/index.php/California_Proposition_11_(2008) (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).  The same 
source does not identify any editorial boards opposed to Proposition 11. 
 101 See, e.g., Nancy Vogel, Prop. 11 Aims to Redo Remap, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at 
B1 [hereinafter Vogel, Prop 11 Aims]. 
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fundraiser for the proposal.102  Despite its close connection to the 
Republican governor, the proposition nevertheless received 
significant support from high-profile Democrats.  For instance, 
Gray Davis, the chief executive who Schwarzenegger replaced 
through the 2003 recall election, supported Proposition 11.103    
Other prominent Democratic supporters included Treasurer Bill 
Lockyer, former Assembly Speaker Robert Hertzberg, and former 
Controller Steve Westly.104  California Forward, a recently-
created reform group, also supported the measure.105  The 
organization’s co-chair was Leon Panetta, former eight-term 
Democratic congressman and chief of staff for President 
Clinton.106 
While Proposition 11’s support was broad-based, its funding 
was anything but.  Of the $14 million contributed to the 
campaign, traditional Democratic supporters gave less than $1 
million.107  Governor Schwarzenegger, in addition to campaigning 
for the measure, also supported it financially.  His campaign 
contributions approached $3 million.108 Not only did 
contributions skew Republican, significant amounts came from 
Republicans outside of California.  Non-California Republican 
contributors included New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, 
T. Boone Pickens,109 and a group of Florida Republicans who 
donated large sums of money after a personal visit from 
Schwarzenegger.110 
 
 102 Michael Rothfeld, Governor Talks, and Funds Flow, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at 
B1. 
 103 Vogel, Prop 11 Aims, supra note 101. 
 104 Id.; George Skelton, Prop. 11 Beats the Alternative, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at 
B1. 
 105 George Skelton, Obama Takes the State’s Best Bet, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2009, at B1. 
 106 Id. 
 107 John Howard, Redistricting: Ultimate Political Battle Looms in California, 
CAPITOL WKLY., June 18, 2009, at A7; Nancy Vogel, California Elections: Key Prop. 11 
Donors Have GOP Ties, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at B1 [hereinafter Vogel, California 
Elections]. 
 108 George Skelton, Prop. 11 Lead Signals Voters’ Reform Mood, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 
2008, at B1. 
 109 Vogel, Prop 11 Aims, supra note 101. 
 110 Vogel, California Elections, supra note 107.  This may overstate their 
contribution, since bankruptcy attorneys are seeking the return of $250,000 contributed 
from Florida attorney Scott Rothstein, who pleaded guilty in January 2010 to running a 
billion-dollar Ponzi scheme. Anthony York, Refund Sought for Disgraced Florida Lawyer’s 
Donation to California’s Prop. 11 Campaign, L.A. TIMES POLITICAL BLOG (May 5, 2010, 
3:50 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/2010/05/florida-lawyers-want-
refund-for-california-political-contribution.html. 
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Not only did Democrats not contribute to the campaign for 
Proposition 11, they did not contribute much to the opposition 
campaign either.  In contrast to the $14 million contributed in 
support of Proposition 11, the “No on 11” campaign received only 
$1 million.111 
Also, in contrast to previous redistricting measures, 
Proposition 11 took a different approach to reform.  Earlier 
propositions provided significant roles for either the major 
parties or for retired state court judges.  For instance, 
Proposition 14 (1982) and Proposition 39 (1984) would have 
allowed the major parties to nominate the redistricting 
commission members.112  Two of the propositions, 39 (1984) and 
77 (2002), would have required that retired judges serve as 
commission members.113  Finally, two measures would have had 
judges either nominate (Proposition 14) or appoint (Proposition 
119) the commissioners.114 
Proposition 11, on the other hand, minimized the role of the 
parties and eliminated any role for retired judges.115  Instead, it 
proposed to establish a “Citizens Redistricting Committee” 
(CRC).116  The CRC would draw new district lines for the State 
Senate, Assembly, and Board of Equalization; under the 
proposition, the Legislature retained the authority to redraw 
congressional districts.117 
 
 111 Howard, supra note 107. 
 112 Heslop, supra note 75, at 1–2. 
 113 Id. at 2; Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting, supra note 54, at 372. 
 114 Heslop, supra note 75, at 1, 4. 
 115 Retired judges were lightning rods for opponents’ attacks in earlier campaigns. 
Steven F. Huefner, Don’t Just Make Redistricters More Accountable to the People, Make 
Them the People, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 41 (2010).  Presumably for this 
reason, the drafters of Proposition 11 eliminated any role for them. 
 116 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1(d), amended by Prop. 11, § 3.2. 
 117 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(a), amended by Prop. 11, § 3.3; CAL. CONST. art. XXI, 
§ 1(b), amended by Prop. 11, § 3.2.  The drafters decided to exclude congressional districts 
from the reach of Proposition 11 to reduce the likelihood that Speaker of the House Nancy 
Pelosi would aggressively oppose the measure. Vogel, Prop 11 Aims, supra note 101.  
Pelosi had vowed to finance the opposition effort heavily if Congress was included. John 
Howard, New Redistricting Initiative Targets Congressional Seats, CAPITOL WKLY. (Sept. 
3, 2009, 12:00 AM), www.capitolweekly.net/article.php?xid=y859w0qbbs932v.  Although 
Pelosi and Senator Barbara Boxer did support the opposition, the $1 million raised by 
opponents fell far short of the $14 million contributed in favor of the proposition. Howard, 
supra note 107.  By contrast, when congressional lines were implicated in 2005’s 
Proposition 77, Pelosi spearheaded the effort to defeat the motion.  In fact, after the 2005 
election, the opposition campaign had more money in the bank ($4 million) than the “No 
on 11” campaign raised during the entire campaign ($1 million). Anthony York, 
Redistricting Fight—from Riches to Rags, CAPITOL WKLY., Oct. 9, 2008, at A1. 
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The CRC would consist of fourteen members: five Democrats, 
five Republicans, and four persons not registered with either 
party.118  Unlike prior proposals, neither the parties, retired 
judges, nor organizations would nominate prospective members; 
instead, they would submit applications.119  The State Auditor 
would establish a panel of three State Auditors to screen the 
applicants.120  This panel would strike applications of persons 
who did not meet a series of requirements identified in the 
proposition.121  Then, this pool of qualified applicants would be 
reduced as follows: 
(1) The state auditors would narrow each of the three groups 
to twenty members;122 
(2) The majority and minority leaders of the Assembly and 
Senate could each strike up to two applicants;123 and 
(3) The State Auditor would randomly draw three 
Democrats, three Republicans, and two persons not 
registered with either party, and these persons would serve 
on the Citizens Redistricting Committee.124 
 
 118 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(2), amended by Prop. 11, § 3.3. 
 119 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(a)(1) (West Supp. 2010), added by Prop. 11, § 4.1. 
 120 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(b) (West Supp. 2010), added by Prop. 11, § 4.1. 
 121 Proposition 11 contains the following minimum criteria for CRC members: (1) Be 
continuously registered in California and have not changed parties for at least five years, 
see CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(3), added by Prop. 11, § 3.3; (2) Have voted in two of the 
last three statewide general elections, see CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(3), added by Prop. 
11, § 3.3; (3) Within ten years of application, neither the applicant nor an immediate 
family member had: served as a candidate for federal or state office, served as an officer, 
employee, or consultant of a political party, served as a member of a political party central 
committee, been a registered lobbyist, served as paid congressional, legislative or Board of 
Equalization staff, contributed $2,000 or more to any candidate for elective office in any 
year, see CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2010), added by Prop. 11, § 4.1.  
While presumably well intended, these limitations would have the effect of filtering out 
many of the most qualified applicants.  Consequently, as Arturo Vargas, the Executive 
Director of the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials noted, “We 
have to identify those folks who are not engaged . . . and convince them to serve.” Shane 
Goldmacher, Drawing Lines, Erasing Biases, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at AA1. 
 122 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(d) (West Supp. 2010), added by Prop. 11, § 4.1. 
 123 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(e) (West Supp. 2010), added by Prop. 11, § 4.1. 
 124 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(f) (West Supp. 2010), added by Prop. 11, § 4.1. 
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Finally, these eight members would then select two 
additional members from each of the three sub-pools.125  Figure 3, 
prepared by the California Legislative Analyst’s Office, presents 
this selection process graphically: 
FIGURE 3126 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 125 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(g) (West Supp. 2010), added by Prop. 11, § 4.1. 
 126 Proposition 11, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (July 17, 2008), http://www.lao.ca.gov/ 
ballot/2008/11_11_2008.aspx (internal figure number omitted). 
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Proponents and opponents alike recognized the unusual 
nature of these procedures.  Bob Stern, the president of the 
Center for Governmental Studies, helped draft Proposition 11.127  
Stern acknowledged that the measure is “complicated . . . .  It 
does take a lot of understanding to vote yes on this.”128  George 
Skelton, a political commentator with the Los Angeles Times and 
Proposition 11 advocate, described its process as “convoluted.”129  
Other words used to characterize these procedures included 
“complex,” “confusing and unfair,” and “byzantine.”130  Probably 
the most colorful description, however, was the following: “The 
mechanisms for selecting the panel seem about as convoluted as 
the weaning out process of a reality TV series.”131 
Proposition 11 provides criteria that the CRC must follow in 
drawing new districts.  First, it must comply with the federal 
requirements of equal population and the Voting Rights Act.  
Second, districts shall be contiguous.  Third, districts must 
respect the geographic integrity of sub-jurisdictions to the extent 
possible.  Fourth, to the extent possible, districts should be 
geographically compact.  Finally, Assembly districts should be 
nested within Senate districts—two Assembly districts wholly 
within each Senate district.132 
 
 127 CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, REDISTRICTING REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: 
PROPOSITION 11 ON THE NOVEMBER 2008 CALIFORNIA BALLOT 5 n.2 (2008), 
http://www.cgs.org/images/publications/redist_memo_rpt_102408_fin.pdf. 
 128 Debra J. Saunders, Return to Redistricting Sanity, RASMUSSEN REPORTS  
(Oct. 5, 2008), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/political_commentary/ 
commentary_by_debra_j_saunders/return_to_redistricting_sanity. 
 129 George Skelton, Reform Takes a Tough Road, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2010, at A2. 
 130 Howard, supra note 107; Matthew Yi, Prop. 11 Leading in Early Returns, S.F. 
CHRON. (Nov. 5, 2008), http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-11-05/news/17127045_1_redrawing-
district-district-lines-independent-citizen.  Recently, Professor John N. Friedman of 
Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government called the selection process “a foray into 
uncharted territory” that could produce a highly positive outcome or “it could really be a 
disaster.” John Mecklin, Redrawn and Quartered: Will the Extraordinary California 
Experiment in Redistricting Spread to Other States?, MILLER-MCCUNE, Mar./Apr. 2010, at 
8, 10. 
 131 Saunders, supra note 128. 
 132 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d), amended by Prop. 11, § 3.3. 
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Despite its vast fundraising and endorsement advantages, 
Proposition 11 had a difficult time attracting the attention of 
voters.133  As Figure 4 indicates, in every poll taken in the five 
months preceding the election, support for the measure never 
exceeded forty-five percent: 
FIGURE 4134 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For most propositions, political consultants expect support to 
fall during the campaign.  Thus, experts anticipated a difficult 
road ahead for Proposition 11.135  Furthermore, at least twenty-
five percent of voters remained undecided about the proposition, 
though this number rose to thirty-five percent on the eve of the 
election.136 
Thus, prior to the election, the factors relating to Proposition 
11 were mixed.  It had overwhelming advantages in fundraising 
and endorsements.  On the other hand, four previous 
redistricting initiatives in California had lost by an average 
 
 133 Nationally, this election involved the historic candidacy of Barack Obama.  In 
California, the ballot also included Proposition 8, which would have restricted the 
definition of marriage to opposite-sex couples, thereby overturning the California 
Supreme Court's ruling of the In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), that same-
sex couples have a constitutional right to marry. 
 134 California Proposition 11 (2008), supra note 100. 
 135 A low percentage of “Yes” voters “is always kind of ominous.  Usually initiatives 
have to start out with a big lead to withstand the No campaign against it,” said Mark 
DiCamillo, Field Poll director. York, supra note 117. 
 136 California Proposition 11 (2008), supra note 134. 
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margin of twenty percentage points.137  Furthermore, voter 
support for Proposition 11 appeared at best to be tepid.138 
In fact, Proposition 11 did succeed, but barely.  In the closest 
proposition contest on the ballot, the measure prevailed by a 
margin of 50.9% to 49.1%.139 
Although it passed, this result may not reflect enthusiastic 
support, but instead that its supporters were less likely to ignore 
the proposition than were its opponents.  Table 3 provides a 
recap of the initiatives that were on the November 4, 2008 ballot: 
TABLE 3140 
COMPARING SUPPORT FOR PROPOSITIONS 
NOVEMBER 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 presents the twelve propositions on the November 
2008 ballot and the total votes in the contest.  The last column 
represents the ratio of votes cast for each proposition compared 
to the total votes cast for Proposition 11.  It shows that fewer 
voters cast a vote—either “Yes” or “No”—for Proposition 11 than 
for any other proposition.  Between 2.5% more votes (290,000) 
 
 137 See supra Table 2. 
 138 See supra Figure 4. 
 139 CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4, 2008, 
GENERAL ELECTION 7 (2008) [hereinafter STATEMENT OF VOTE 2008], available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/sov_complete.pdf. 
 140 Id. at 7. 
Total "Yes" 
and "No" 
Votes
% of 
Votes 
Cast for 
Prop 11
1A High-Speed  Train Bond 12,696,429 105.9
2 Farm Animals Confinement 12,935,507 107.9
3 Children’s  Hospital  Bond 12,638,905 105.4
4 Parental Notification 12,948,951 108.0
5 Nonviolent Drug Offenses Sentencing 12,721,989 106.1
6 Police and Law Enforcement Funding 12,384,019 103.3
7 Renewable Energy Generation 12,657,416 105.5
8 Eliminates  Same-Sex Couples Marriage 13,402,566 111.8
9 Criminal  Justice  System  Victims’  Rights 12,411,433 103.5
10 Alternative Fuel  and Renewable Energy Bonds 12,562,820 104.8
11 Redistricting 11,992,688 100.0
12 Veterans’  Bond  Act 12,288,826 102.5
Proposition Number and Description
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and 11.8% more votes (1.4 million) were cast for propositions 
other than for Proposition 11.  One consideration is voter roll-off, 
which tends to be greater the lower an issue physically appears 
on the ballot.141  Since Proposition 11 was the second to last 
measure in the election, roll-off could explain this disparity.  
Studies, however, have found that voter roll-off in lower visibility 
contests can be double that of higher visibility contests.142  The 
reverse seems to have occurred in California in 2008, where a 
higher visibility contest, Proposition 11, had a higher roll-off 
than did lower visibility measures.143 
Despite the effort expended in support of the measure, both 
the opposition and the electorate in general displayed 
ambivalence toward Proposition 11.  Certainly, most Democratic 
leaders opposed the motion.  The “No on 11” campaign listed both 
Speaker Pelosi and Senator Boxer as members.144  Furthermore, 
with significant majorities in both state houses, Democrats 
seemed to be the party with the most to lose.145  Nevertheless, the 
measure’s drafters specifically excluded congressional re-
districting from its reach to avoid a major fundraising effort by 
Pelosi.146  This strategy worked.  In 2005, Pelosi spearheaded the 
fundraising effort, but she also received significant assistance 
from California Senate President Pro Tem Don Perata and then-
Assembly Speaker Fabian Nunez.147  Furthermore, two powerful 
unions in California, the California Teachers Association and the 
Service Employees International Union, staunchly opposed the 
governor’s special election slate in 2005.148  In 2008, both unions 
were neutral on Proposition 11.149  As a result of these 
differences, in 2005 the opposition to Proposition 77 spent $13 
 
 141 Roll-off is “[t]he difference between how many people go to the polls and how many 
people actually vote on a specific [contest].” David C. Brody, The Use of Judicial 
Performance Evaluation to Enhance Judicial Accountability, Judicial Independence, and 
Public Trust, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 115, 127–28 (2008).  In legal and academic literature, 
“roll-off,” “falloff,” “dropoff,” and “ballot fatigue” refer to the same concept. Id. at 128.  In 
the November general election, the total votes cast were 13.74 million. STATEMENT OF 
VOTE 2008, supra note 139, at 3.  Thus, even Proposition 8, the measure with the highest 
votes cast, experienced some roll-off (340,000 votes). Id. at 62. 
 142 James Sample, Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 293, 301 n.34 (2010). 
 143 For instance, despite Governor Schwarzenegger’s campaigning and national 
fundraising efforts, Proposition 11 received fewer votes than did two bond initiatives, 
Propositions 10 and 12. See supra Table 3. 
 144 Howard, supra note 107. 
 145 Vogel, California Elections, supra note 107. 
 146 Vogel, Prop 11 Aims, supra note 101. 
 147 York, supra note 117. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
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million150 (which does not include $4 million in unexpended 
funds);151 in 2008, the opposition to Proposition 11 spent only $1 
million.152 
Apparently, the Democrats’ reserved approach to the 
measure stemmed from more than just Proposition 11’s failure to 
apply to congressional redistricting.  Possibly because of the 
weak performance of previous redistricting initiatives, the 
Democrats did not expect Proposition 11 to succeed.153 
Voters also lacked enthusiasm for the redistricting measure.  
As Figure 4 demonstrates, throughout the campaign, polling 
indicated that at least twenty-five percent of voters were 
undecided regarding Proposition 11, peaking at thirty-five 
percent on the eve of the election.154  For their part, prospective 
voters indicated that the measure was low on their list of 
priorities for the election.155  Besides the presidential election, 
among the eleven other initiatives on the ballot was Proposition 
8, regarding same-sex marriage.156  In contrast to the combined 
$15 million raised in support and opposition of Proposition 11, 
Proposition 8 raised a combined total of $83.2 million from both 
sides.157  The high roll-off for Proposition 11 likely resulted from 
the mixture of many factors: confusion, uncertainty, placement 
on the ballot, ballot fatigue,158 and attention focused on other 
choices on the ballot. 
 
 150 LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS ET AL., BUILDING A NATIONAL REDISTRICTING REFORM 
MOVEMENT: REDISTRICTING CONFERENCE REPORT 11, available at 
http://www.americansforredistrictingreform.org/html/documents/SLCRedistrictingReport
FINAL.pdf. 
 151 York, supra note 117. 
 152 Howard, supra note 107. 
 153 Editorial, A Political Triple Whammy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2010, at A12. 
 154 Likely some of this uncertainty resulted from the complexity of the proposition 
itself. See supra text accompanying notes 127–131. 
 155 As one voter who admitted that she abstained from voting on the proposition 
stated: “Redistricting.  We need to do more immediate things.” Tamara Audi et al., 
California Votes for Prop 8, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2008, 10:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB122586056759900673.html. 
 156 See supra Table 3. 
 157 Lisa Leff, Donors Pumped $83M into Prop. 8 Race, KSL.COM (Feb. 2, 2009, 
8:05 PM), http://www.ksl.com/?nid=148&sid=5490691.  The measure’s sponsors raised 
$39.9 million and spent all but $983,000; the opposition received $43.3 million and had 
$730,000 left after the election. Id.  As another indicator of the interest in this measure, it 
received the highest vote total of any of the measures in the election. See supra Table 3.  
Another initiative, Proposition 2, which sought to impose standards for confinement of 
certain farm animals, also attracted significant contributions; supporters contributed 
$10.6 million, and opponents donated $8.9 million. California Proposition 2 (2008), 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_Proposition_2_(2008) (last visited Oct. 
23, 2010). 
 158 While more ballot initiatives lead to higher turnout, too many policy questions 
may have a negative effect of decreasing turnout. See Caroline J. Tolbert, John A. 
Grummel & Daniel A. Smith, The Effects of Ballot Initiatives on Voter Turnout in the 
American States, 29 AM. POL. RES. 625, 635 (2001).  See also Kirk J. Stark, The Right to 
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Was the passage of Proposition 11 foreseeable despite the 
abysmal track record of California redistricting initiatives?  
Under the circumstances, yes.  After reviewing redistricting 
initiatives nationwide, Nicholas Stephanopoulos developed a set 
of factors leading to the passage of such measures.  He analyzed 
the campaigns of every redistricting initiative since 1936,159 
including the California predecessors of Proposition 11, and 
initiatives from Arkansas (1936), Oklahoma (1960 and 1962), 
North Dakota (1973), Colorado (1974), Ohio (1981 and 2005), and 
Arizona (2000).160  Stephanopoulos concluded that the most 
important variable in determining a proposition’s success was 
the legislative-majority party’s opposition to the measure.161  He 
identified several characteristics of successful opposition 
campaigns run by the majority party including “raising large 
sums of money, campaigning furiously against the measure, and 
striving to frame the debate in the most advantageous possible 
terms.”162 
A comparison between the campaigns of the two most recent 
California redistricting initiatives supports Stephanopoulos’ 
conclusion.  In 2005, the opposition to Proposition 77 raised 
$14 million; in 2008, the “No on 11” campaign raised only 
$1 million.163  In 2005, Speaker Pelosi pledged: “I am very 
committed to defeating Proposition 77, and I am raising money to 
defeat it.”164  In 2008, she basically sat on the sidelines since the 
measure did not involve congressional districts.  In 2005, the 
opposition successfully characterized the proposition as “a 
Republican power grab.”165  In 2008, the “Yes on 11” campaign 
succeeded by focusing on anti-incumbent sentiments.166 
 
Vote on Taxes, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 248 (2001) (noting that voters feel a “ballot fatigue” 
when “faced with ever longer lists of issues to decide on election day”). 
 159 Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting, supra note 54, at 346. 
 160 See id. 
 161 Id. at 380.  In reaching this conclusion, Stephanopoulos also identified several 
factors that were not dispositive.  These included the governor’s position on the 
proposition, the legislative minority’s support, the actual proposal, interest group 
positions, and the extent of any recent gerrymanders. Id. at 379–80. 
 162 Id. at 381. 
 163 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 164 Christian Berthelsen, Group Backing Remap Initiative Caught up in Donations 
Dispute, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 7, 2005, at B3.  As part of this commitment, she asked all 
thirty-three California Democrats in Congress to contribute against the proposition. Id. 
 165 Hubert Huang, The Strange Journey of Proposition 77, CARDINAL INQUIRER (Nov. 
3, 2005), http://www.stanford.edu/class/comm273/2005/hhboy77/strangejourney.html (“In 
an attempt to dispel the notion that the proposition is a disguise for a Republican power 
grab, Schwarzenegger went to Ohio and show [sic] his support for its redistricting 
initiative, the Democrat-backed Issue 4.”). 
 166 John Wildermuth, Prop. 11 Won By Not Talking About Redistricting, S.F. GATE 
POLITICS BLOG (Dec. 1, 2008, 6:06 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/nov05election/ 
detail?blogid=14&entry_id=33086#ixzz0swyfQTzL. 
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Nicholas Mosich, on the other hand, argues that 2005’s 
Proposition 77 actually lost because of three different factors.  
Specifically, he identified: “(1) California’s history of resistance to 
redistricting reform initiatives, (2) fierce bipartisan opposition to 
Proposition 77, and (3) voters’ perception of the special election 
as a referendum on Governor Schwarzenegger’s leadership.”167 
Looking solely at the 2005 election, Mosich’s conclusions are 
appealing; they do not, however, explain the subsequent success 
of Proposition 11.  First, Californians certainly have 
demonstrated a reluctance to adopt a new redistricting 
procedure.168  Indeed, this reluctance may have manifested itself 
in the narrowness of Proposition 11’s victory.  Nevertheless, the 
measure did taste victory.  Furthermore, even if this history were 
a factor, one would expect it to have a greater effect in 2008, only 
three years after the defeat of Proposition 77, rather than in 
2005, fifteen years after the last failed proposition.169  Second, 
Schwarzenegger’s approval and disapproval ratings were almost 
identical shortly before each election.  According to the Field Poll, 
his approval ratings rose from thirty-seven percent in October 
2005 to thirty-eight percent in September 2008; and during the 
same period, his disapproval ratings fell from fifty-six percent to 
fifty-two percent.170  Thus, two of the factors identified by Mosich 
do not help to explain Proposition 11’s success.  The second factor 
he identifies, fierce bipartisan opposition, may help to explain 
Proposition 77’s failure.  It does not, however, explain the failure 
of earlier propositions, which only one party opposed. 
Thus, Stephanopoulos’ theory—that the legislative-majority 
party’s vigorous opposition to the measure is the most significant 
factor in the failure of a proposition—seems to explain best the 
failure of Proposition 11’s predecessors.  The lack of such 
opposition also best explains Proposition 11’s subsequent success.  
This was the first redistricting proposition not to face concerted 
opposition from the majority party, and it was the first such 
proposition to succeed. 
 
 167 Nicholas D. Mosich, Note, Judging the Three-Judge Panel: An Evaluation of 
California’s Proposed Redistricting Commission, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 165, 198–99 (2005). 
 168 Id. at 198. 
 169 See supra Table 2. 
 170 Mark DiCamillo & Mervin Field, New Record Low Job Ratings for Both 
Schwarzenegger and the State Legislature, FIELD POLL, Oct. 13, 2009, at 2, 
http://www.field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/R1s2315.pdf. 
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III.  COMPETITIVENESS:  IS IT DESIRABLE? 
Supporters of Proposition 11 promised one result: 
competitive elections.  But, are competitive elections desirable?  
Even if they are, are they attainable in California?  These are the 
questions that the next two sections explore. 
To sell Proposition 11 to the voters, its proponents 
maintained that it would increase electoral competitiveness.171  
Governor Schwarzenegger, the proposition’s top contributor and 
fundraiser and highest-profile proponent, charged that “the 
current redistricting system . . . insulates lawmakers from 
competitive general elections.”172  Similarly, Democrat and 
former-Controller Steve Westly assured the public that the 
proposition would create more competitive election districts.173  
But the “competitiveness” drumbeat did not stop there.  Others 
who touted the proposition’s ability to increase competitiveness 
included redistricting experts,174 a non-profit organization,175 and 
several newspaper editorial boards.176 
Despite this focus on competitiveness in the 2008 campaign, 
no discussion arose concerning the merits of competitiveness.  
Several commentators have pushed for redistricting reform to 
enhance competition in general elections.  They have raised three 
main benefits of greater competitiveness: increased electoral 
participation, election of moderate legislators, and greater 
responsiveness of those legislators to the needs of their 
constituents. 
 
 171 Interestingly, the initiative does not actually require that the redistricting 
commission draw competitive districts.  Proposition 11 delineates multiple standards for 
redrawing maps, see supra text accompanying note 132, but it does not include 
competitiveness among these requirements. 
 172 Steven Harmon, Governor Pivots to Campaign Mode, STATEWIDE DATABASE (Sept. 
24, 2008), http://swdb.berkeley.edu/resources/Redistricting_News/california/2008/ 
September/Governor_pivots_to_09_24-08.htm. 
 173 Bay City News Service, Schwarzenegger Stumps for Prop. 11, PALO ALTO ONLINE 
(Oct. 24, 2008, 8:41 AM), http://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/show_story.php?id=9783. 
 174 Patrick McGreevy, Democrats Fall Short in Bid for a Super Majority, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 6, 2008, at B4 (quoting professor John J. Pitney of Claremont McKenna College as 
saying, “[Proposition 11] will make more seats competitive”);; Stephanopoulos, A Fighting 
Chance for Redistricting, supra note 32 (“What’s good about Proposition 11 is that it 
would make California’s elections more competitive.”). 
 175 ACLU/SC Supports the California Voters FIRST Initiative on the November 
Ballot, ACLU OF S. CAL. (June 18, 2008), http://www.aclu-sc.org/releases/view/102890. 
 176 See supra note 100 (citing references).  See also Editorial, Let Citizens Redraw the 
Map, DAILY BREEZE, Mar. 17, 2008, at 10A (“New plan to create competitive legislative 
districts in California merits support.”);; Editorial, California Voters Should Support 
Redistricting Ballot Measure, FRESNO BEE, Mar. 25, 2008, at C4 (“More competitive races 
will make lawmakers more accountable.”);; Editorial, An Essential Reform, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIBUNE, Mar. 10, 2008, at B6 (“This is why it’s absolutely crucial to have as many 
competitive legislative districts as possible.”). 
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First, supporters maintain that greater competitiveness can 
benefit the entire electoral process.  Competitiveness increases 
voter turnout rates.177  The political parties are sensitive to 
competition and focus their limited resources where elections are 
competitive.178  They target television advertising and other 
mobilizing efforts mainly in competitive races,179 and studies 
have found that persons contacted through mobilization efforts 
are more likely to vote.180  Presumably, greater interest also 
leads to more media attention, higher campaign contributions, 
and a sense that one’s vote matters.181  Accordingly, the closer 
the anticipated outcome of an election, the more voters become 
involved182 and the better informed they are likely to be.183  
Furthermore, competitive elections can affect participation even 
after the election.  For instance, after the 2000 presidential 
election, voter registration drives surged.184  In addition to their 
effect on voters, competitive elections are essential to other 
aspects of the democratic process.  For instance, they encourage 
the appearance of strong challengers to majority-party 
candidates, which also stimulates party mobilization and 
campaign contributions.185 
Proponents also maintain that more competitive districts can 
yield more centrist candidates.  Studies suggest that at the 
individual district level “more competitive seats lead to more 
moderate members and . . . ‘cross-pressured’ members are more 
likely to have more centrist voting scores.”186  When districts are 
not competitive, candidates know that voters in their districts are 
 
 177 Shelley de Alth, ID at the Polls: Assessing the Impact of Recent State Voter ID 
Laws on Voter Turnout, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV 185, 192 (2009). 
 178  Michael P. McDonald, The Competitive Problem of Voter Turnout, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 31, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/30/ 
AR2006103000712.html. 
 179 Id. 
 180 ROBERT HUCKFELDT ET AL., INFORMATION, ACTIVATION, AND ELECTORAL 
COMPETITION IN THE 2002 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 22, available at 
http://psfaculty.ucdavis.edu/huckfeldt/website_revise060106.pdf. 
 181 See generally id. (exploring the correlation between voter engagement with an 
issue and political competitiveness). 
 182 STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, 
AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 180–81 (Bruce Nichols & Robert Miller eds., 1993). 
 183 Peter J. Jenkins, Comment, The Supreme Court's Confused Election Law 
Jurisprudence: Should Competitiveness Matter?, 2007 BYU L. REV. 167, 171. 
 184 LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE POLITICS OF VOTER FRAUD 18 (Mar. 5, 2007), available 
at http://www.projectvote.org/component/content/article/254-Voter%20Fraud/561-the-
politics-of-voter-fraud.html. 
 185 Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV 
253, 260 (2006). 
 186 Walter M. Frank, Making Our Congressional Elections More Competitive; A 
Proposal for a Limited Number of Statewide At-Large Elections in Our More Populous 
States, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1425, 1427 (2006). 
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unlikely to support challengers from the other party.187  This 
enables candidates to be more attentive to those voters who cast 
ballots in primary elections, who tend to be more partisan and 
less moderate than voters in general elections.  When they are 
focused on this sort of voter, candidates are more likely to take 
extreme positions instead of representing the political center.188  
Thus, noncompetitive districts undermine centrists, who can win 
competitive general elections but not primaries in heavily-
partisan districts.  Noncompetitive districts thus impact the 
partisanship, and possibly the effectiveness, of legislatures.189  Of 
course, the hope of many supporters of competitive districts is 
that an increase in centrist legislators will reduce both 
partisanship and gridlock in legislatures.190 
Competitive districts may also increase the accountability of 
legislators to the voters.191  Districts that are competitive compel 
legislators to respect the interests of their constituents or face a 
realistic chance of defeat.192  Furthermore, districts with 
competitive elections prevent parties from becoming 
overwhelmingly dominant in geographic areas and lacking 
incentives to compete for voters.193  Some commentators consider 
accountability to be the central purpose of elections.194  Others 
consider it to have a constitutional basis or to function as part of 
the checks and balances fundamental to the Constitution.195  
Another aspect of accountability regards corruption of elected 
officials.  One study found that in the 1980s, among candidates 
 
 187 Jenkins, supra note 183, at 170–71. 
 188 Id. at 171. 
 189 Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV 2311, 2380 (2006).  See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna B. Prakash, Tempest 
in an Empty Teapot: Why the Constitution Does Not Regulate Gerrymandering, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1, 13 (2008) (asserting that the replacement of centrist legislators with 
extremists produces polarized, factious, and inefficient legislatures). 
 190 See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 189, at 2381. 
 191 Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 
629 (2002).  However, some results suggest that a lack of electoral competition actually 
increases the responsiveness of legislators. BENJAMIN G. BISHIN, COMPETITION AND THE 
CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATION: ARE THE BENEFITS OF COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS 
OVERSTATED? 27, available at http://moya.bus.miami.edu/~bbishin/ccr.pdf. 
 192 Timothy P. Brennan, Note, Cleaning Out the Augean Stables: Pennsylvania's Most 
Recent Redistricting and a Call to Clean Up This Messy Process, 13 WIDENER L.J. 235, 
338 (2003). 
 193 Pildes, supra note 185, at 260. 
 194 Richard Briffault, Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan 
Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 411 (2005). 
 195 See Pildes, supra note 185, at 265–66 (arguing that the Elections Clause prohibits 
the self-interested manipulation in the creation of overwhelmingly safe and 
noncompetitive districts that destroy electoral accountability); Brennan, supra note 192, 
at 337 (asserting that the Founders believed that legislators should be accountable to the 
people, which was the most essential Constitutional check on the government). 
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charged with corruption, only 3.8% percent lost in primaries, 
while their loss rate in the general election was 25%.196 
Defenders of noncompetitive districts, however, point to 
several valuable functions they provide.  They argue that 
noncompetitive districts provide better representation for their 
voters and promote stability of the Legislature.  They also 
maintain that competitive elections, rather than inspiring 
crossover appeals, actually lead to “getting out the base” efforts. 
Critics point out that, by definition, competitive districts 
leave more voters unrepresented.  A major drawback of single-
member districts is that the votes for the losing candidate are 
“wasted.”197  Closely-balanced districts therefore maximize the 
number of wasted votes.198  A district that is less competitive in 
general elections forces candidates to take positions more akin to 
those of the typical voter of the district; thus legislators elected 
from homogenous districts will be more representative of more of 
the district’s voters.199  Furthermore, from the perspective of 
voter satisfaction, competitive elections are less desirable.  
Unlike with sporting events, when it comes to elections voters 
prefer blowouts (large victory margins) to exciting finishes 
(competitive contests).200 Voters also prefer to have 
representatives with similar ideologies over having closely-
contested general elections.201  As an additional psychological 
benefit, voters give Congress higher approval ratings when like-
minded persons represent their districts.202  Thus, non-
competitive districts may maximize voter satisfaction.203 
Another advantage pointed to by commentators is that 
noncompetitive districts increase the stability of the Legislature 
as a whole.  With more competitive districts, partisan control of 
the Legislature would change more frequently.204  Thus, slight 
 
 196 Matthew G. Jarvis, Competition is Good: Side-Benefits of Competitive Districts 
14–15 (Aug. 28–31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for presentation at the 2008 
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association), available at 
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/7/9/2/7/pages279276/p2
79276-1.php. 
 197 Brunell, supra note 10, at 46. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Thomas I. Brunell & Justin Buchler, Ideological Representation and Competitive 
Congressional Elections, 28 ELECTORAL STUD. 448, 449 (2009). 
 200 Id. at 455.  On the other hand, the satisfaction of voters who supported losing 
candidates is not related to the margin of defeat. Id. at 456. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. at 454. 
 203 This may explain the finding that turnout rates are curvilinear—while the most 
competitive counties have the highest turnout rates, so too do the least competitive 
counties. DAVID E. CAMPBELL, WHY WE VOTE: HOW SCHOOLS AND COMMUNITIES SHAPE 
OUR CIVIC LIFE 34 (2006). 
 204 HUCKFELDT ET AL., supra note 180, at 22. 
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changes in voter preferences would shift control of the 
Legislature.205  At the extremes of competitiveness, a statewide 
vote of only fifty-one or fifty-two percent in favor of a party might 
shift control in the Legislature.206  Because of legal207 and 
geographic constraints,208 no districting plan for California will 
have all hyper-competitive districts.  Nevertheless, the risk of 
shifts in partisan control remains.209 
Opponents of competitiveness also argue that high levels of 
competition can adversely affect individual officeholders and 
candidates.  Candidates would likely be less interested in 
running for office if they knew that slight changes in political 
sentiment would remove them from office.  Thus, less competitive 
districts can be more appealing to prospective candidates because 
greater stability makes the possibility of a career in the 
Legislature more likely.210  Conversely, competitive elections 
deter candidates because of the foreseeable burden of 
campaigning in future close elections.211  Incumbents who are 
concerned about upcoming competitive elections have greater 
incentives to steer pork barrel projects to their districts in 
attempts to “buy off” their constituents.212  Similarly, they are 
more likely to focus on parochial issues rather than on those of 
benefit to the larger whole, be it a region, state, or nation.213 
 
 205 Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial 
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 668 (2002).  
See also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 359 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing 
the fact that in a large state with mere random redistricting, a shift from fifty-one percent 
Republican to forty-nine percent Republican could yield a “seismic shift” in the 
composition of the legislature from one hundred percent Republican to one hundred 
percent Democrat). 
 206 Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting 
in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 39–40 (1985). 
 207 See infra text accompanying notes 219–232. 
 208 See infra text accompanying notes 233–256. 
 209 Possibly a more likely concern in California is that a large number of competitive 
districts could result in significantly disproportional representation.  Non-proportional 
legislatures are likely where excessive numbers of districts are competitive. Brunell, 
supra note 10, at 75. 
 210 See Sally Dworak-Fisher, Note, Drawing the Line on Incumbency Protection, 2 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 131, 137 (1996).  See also Thomas Brunell, When Competition Is Bad 
for Voters and Democracy, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (June 3, 2008, 9:07 AM), 
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/opinion/viewpoints/stories/DN-
brunell_03edi.ART.State.Edition1.45fe223.html (asserting that a district that is less 
competitive in general elections is more attractive to strong candidates of the majority 
party to run in the primary). 
 211 Daniel R. Ortiz, Federalism, Reapportionment, and Incumbency: Leading the 
Legislature to Police Itself, 4 J. L. & Pol. 653, 683 (1988). 
 212 Recent Developments, Independent Redistricting Commissions, 43 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 535, 543 (2006). 
 213 Justin Buchler, Competition, Representation and Redistricting: The Case Against 
Competitive Congressional Districts, 17 J. THEORETICAL POL. 431, 461 (2005). 
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Critics also charge that competitive districts may rely upon a 
premise that is not always applicable.  Proponents argue that 
competitive districts will force candidates to take less extreme 
positions.214  Candidates, however, do not always follow this 
strategy.  For instance, after the 2000 presidential election, in 
which George W. Bush lost the popular vote but won the electoral 
college vote by 271 to 266,215 President Bush did not focus on 
winning swing voters.  Instead of targeting moderate voters, his 
reelection campaign focused on mobilizing his own party’s 
voters.216  Since the majority of “independent” voters are not 
truly swing voters but actually favor one party,217 the drawing of 
competitive districts may not force candidates to broaden their 
appeal.  Instead, such districts may actually heighten partisan 
appeals.218 
While the virtues of competitiveness are more intuitive, a 
lack of competitiveness may be beneficial.  This is reassuring, 
since Proposition 11 is unlikely to accomplish its goal of 
increasing competition. 
 
 214 See supra notes 186–190 and accompanying text. 
 215 David Leip, 2000 Presidential General Election Results, ATLAS OF U.S. 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://www.uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year= 
2000&off=0&elect=0&f=0 (last visited Oct. 24, 2010). 
 216 Ronald Brownstein, The Race to the White House: Bush Aims to Solidify His Base, 
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2004, at A1.  This strategy did not begin with President Bush; 
parties have utilized it since the earliest days of the union. Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral 
Damage: The Endangered Center in American Politics, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 426 
(2004). 
 217 Tom Jacobs, ‘Independent’ Voters Are Generally Not, MILLER-MCCUNE (July 28, 
2009), http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/independent-voters-are-generally-not-3560/.  
According to Tom Jensen, communications director of Public Policy Polling, “two-thirds of 
independent voters are not swing voters.” Id.  Conventional political science wisdom holds 
that “independents” who acknowledge that they “lean” toward one party actually behave 
like closet partisans.  They are politically active and interested and loyal to the party to 
which they lean. Eric McGhee & Daniel Krimm, Party Registration and the Geography of 
Party Polarization, 41 POLITY 345, 359 (2009). 
 218 Furthermore, a study of Congressional polarization concluded that 
gerrymandering explains little if any of the polarization apparent in Congress. Nolan 
McCarty et al., Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization? 5 (Oct. 23, 2006), available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~nmccarty/gerrymander11.pdf.  Indeed, the authors found that 
legislative polarization is consistent with the general geographic polarization of voters 
along ideological and partisan lines. Id. at 4.  Masket, Winburn, and Wright found that 
representatives elected from legislatively-drawn districts are actually less polarized than 
members of Congress whose districts were drawn by a non-legislative body. Seth Masket 
et al., The Limits of the Gerrymander: Examining the Impact of Redistricting on Electoral 
Competition and Legislative Polarization 20 (Aug. 31–Sept. 3, 2006) (unpublished paper 
presented at annual meeting of American Political Science Association), available at 
http://www.votelaw.com/blog/blogdocs/Limits%20of%20the%20gerrymander.pdf.  Another 
study found that, while redistricting was a factor in polarization, the U.S. Senate, which 
does not undergo redistricting, and the House had become polarized concurrently. Sean 
M. Theriault, The Case of the Vanishing Moderates: Party Polarization in the Modern 
Congress 19 (2004), available at http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_ 
citation/0/8/3/2/6/pages83269/p83269-19.php. 
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IV.  NON-COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS:  MIGHT SOMETHING BESIDES 
REDISTRICTING CAUSE THEM? 
Whether or not competitiveness is desirable, legislative 
elections in California have experienced a marked competitive 
decline,219 and supporters of Proposition 11 have insisted that 
legislative redistricting is the cause.  A more careful study of 
applicable legal requirements and geographic considerations, 
however, indicates that Proposition 11 is unlikely to increase 
competitiveness significantly. 
As previously discussed, federal and state laws constrain the 
drawing of legislative districts.  Line drawers must populate the 
districts equally,220 and they must not dilute minority voting 
strength.221  California law also imposes additional mandatory 
(contiguity)222 and nonmandatory (respect for jurisdictional 
boundaries)223 requirements.  The combination of these 
constraints, however, limits the ability of redistricters to draw 
more competitive districts. 
Bruce Cain, Karin Mac Donald, and Iris Hui examined the 
impact of legal criteria on the drawing of competitive districts.224  
They noted a truism of redistricting: the imposition of multiple 
criteria will “highly constrain” the accomplishment of any single 
goal.  In other words, mandating more than one criteria 
necessarily will require trade-offs among criteria.225  Compliance 
with the Voting Rights Act, for instance, necessitates avoiding 
both minority vote dilution and retrogression of minority voting 
 
 219 See supra Figure 2.  Although the competitiveness of California’s districts has 
declined, this is not solely a California phenomenon.  Analysis of congressional elections 
reveals that victory margins for incumbents have been rising nationwide since the early 
1990s (for open seats, election margins during the period have fluctuated).  Legislative 
control of redistricting has not correlated to higher victory margins. Masket et al., supra 
note 218, at 14. 
 220 See supra notes 8–13, 27 and accompanying text. 
 221 See supra notes 14–26 and accompanying text. 
 222 See supra note 28. 
 223 See supra note 29. 
 224 See generally BRUCE E. CAIN, KARIN MAC DONALD & IRIS HUI, INSTITUTE FOR 
GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, COMPETITION AND REDISTRICTING IN CALIFORNIA: LESSONS FOR 
REFORM (2006).  Specifically, they instructed a team of mappers to draw demonstrative 
assembly district plans for California.  As part of this experiment, they “switched on or 
off” particular redistricting constraints to determine their effects on the drawing of 
districts for California.  These particular requirements were: (1) compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act; (2) minimizing the splitting of subjurisdictions; and (3) enhancing 
competitiveness.  They began by drawing “random-box” plans (using only Census 
population data) to establish benchmarks from which the effect of adding a particular 
constraint could be measured.  Then, they instructed the mappers to add one of the 
constraints in separate plans.  Finally, they instructed them to draw maps incorporating 
all three criteria. Id. at 22. 
 225 Id. at 5. 
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strength.226  Since African Americans and Latinos are 
predominantly Democratic, the legally-mandated majority-
minority districts are usually heavily-Democratic and 
intentionally noncompetitive in general elections (so the minority 
population can elect its candidate of choice).227  Conversely, since 
these districts require the inclusion of large concentrations of 
Democratic voters, they deplete the pool of Democratic voters for 
surrounding districts, thereby facilitating—or even 
necessitating—the drawing of safe Republican districts.228 
Thus, the Voting Rights Act requirements have significant 
redistricting consequences.  The Voting Rights Act reduces 
competitiveness not only by altering the configuration of 
districts, but also by reducing the pool of districts available for 
competition.  In California, Cain et al. found that minority 
populations have been dispersing geographically.229  As a result, 
to satisfy the Voting Rights Act standards, map drawers need to 
extend districts to encompass pockets of ethnic communities.230  
This constrains their options when populating surrounding 
districts.  Moreover, states that must satisfy the section 5 non-
retrogression requirement typically have fewer marginal districts 
and fewer districts with two major-party candidates.231  
Consequently, preserving minority voting strength often occurs 
at the direct expense of electoral competitiveness.232 
Another factor that explains the decline in competitiveness is 
population redistribution.  During the past two decades, our 
population has realigned itself geographically along political 
lines.  Bill Bishop labels this phenomenon as “The Big Sort.”233  
As a result, regions, states, and counties now are much more 
politically homogenous than they were just three decades ago.234 
 
 226 See supra notes 14–26 and accompanying text. 
 227 Lublin & McDonald, supra note 34, at 147. 
 228 Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Deep Red and Blue Congressional Districts: The Causes 
and Consequences of Declining Party Competitiveness, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 135, 
152 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 8th ed. 2005). 
 229 See Lublin & McDonald, supra note 34, at 147. 
 230 CAIN ET AL., supra note 224, at 24. 
 231 Lublin & McDonald, supra note 34, at 155. 
 232 CAIN ET AL., supra note 224, at 24.  Similarly, because of the unusual 
configurations of many city and county boundaries, respecting those lines also 
significantly constrains competitiveness. Id. at 26.  While this is not a mandatory 
standard that redistricters must follow, the California Constitution nonetheless does 
require that the geographic integrity of cities and counties be respected to the greatest 
extent possible without violating other requirements. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(3). 
 233 BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT 42 (2008). 
 234 Id. 
Do Not Delete 3/16/2011 4:50 PM 
346 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 14:311 
This sorting is possible because we have a highly mobile 
population.  For instance, in 2008, 11 million Americans moved 
to a different county.235  While the population of the United 
States has always exhibited a high rate of mobility, the nature of 
this movement has changed in recent decades.236  Beginning in 
the 1970s and 1980s, when people moved, they tended to relocate 
to areas where most residents held similar political 
perspectives.237  In general, when people select a locale in which 
to live, they choose where to live within that locale based upon 
factors that correlate with partisan preferences.238  These factors 
include immigration, education, income, and religion.239  Thus, 
Democrats began moving to Democrat-majority counties and 
Republicans to Republican counties.  Similarly, as Democrats left 
Republican areas, Republicans were more likely to replace them, 
and vice versa.240  This trend differed markedly from the racial 
consequences of these movements.  From 1980 to 2000, American 
counties became slightly less segregated, whereas during the 
same period, the segregation of Republicans and Democrats 
increased by almost twenty-six percent.241 
Within California, these shifts are readily apparent.  The 
1976 and 2004 presidential elections provide good points for 
comparison.  Both races were very closely contested at the 
national level.  In 1976, Jimmy Carter prevailed over Gerald 
Ford by a popular vote margin nationwide of 2.1% (50.1% to 
48.0%); in 2004, George W. Bush defeated John Kerry by a 
similar margin of 2.4% (50.7% to 48.3%).242  During the twenty-
eight years between these elections, forty-seven of California’s  
 
 235 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 1: GENERAL MOBILITY, BY RACE AND HISPANIC 
ORIGIN, REGION, SEX, AGE, RELATIONSHIP TO HOUSEHOLDER, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, 
MARITAL STATUS, NATIVITY, TENURE, AND POVERTY STATUS: 2008 TO 2009, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/migrate/cps2009.html (follow excel for 
United States Table 1).  At the same time, another twenty-five million persons moved 
within the same county. Id.  In addition to population mobility, population growth has 
been the other major cause of California’s political redistribution. JAMES G. GIMPEL & 
JASON E. SCHUKNECHT, PATCHWORK NATION: SECTIONALISM AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 76 (2004). 
 236 Oppenheimer, supra note 228, at 152–53. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Oppenheimer, supra note 228, at 153. 
 239 Alan I. Abramowitz et al., Don’t Blame Redistricting for Uncompetitive Elections, 
39 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 87, 88 (2006). 
 240 BISHOP, supra note 233, at 44. 
 241 Id. at 10. 
 242 David Leip, ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 
http://www.uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=2000&off=0&elect=0&f=0 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2010). 
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fifty-eight counties (81%) became more partisan.  Specifically, 
seventeen counties (29.3%) became more Democratic while thirty 
(51.7%) became more Republican.243  Only eleven (20.0%) became 
more closely contested.244 
Three counties provide especially illuminating illustrations 
of this shift: San Francisco,245 Los Angeles, and Kern.  San 
Francisco is an example of an area that became increasingly 
partisan during this period despite a stable overall population 
size.  Figure 5 charts the Democratic and Republican votes in 
presidential general elections in San Francisco: 
FIGURE 5246 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the first three elections, San Francisco leaned slightly 
toward the Republicans.  However, starting in 1960, the 
Democratic candidate won the county, and Democrats have won 
every presidential general election since then.  Starting in 1976, 
the Democratic margin of victory has increased from the previous 
elections, with the sole exception being in 1996.  By 2008, the 
Republican candidate (McCain) garnered only 13.6% of San  
 
 243 BISHOP, supra note 233, at 44. 
 244 Id. 
 245 The California legislature consolidated the city and county of San Francisco in 
1856. Percy v. Long, Consolidated City and County Government of San Francisco, 8 PROC. 
OF THE AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N 109, 109 (1912).  It is the only consolidated city and county in 
California. Id. at 110. 
 246 CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, Statewide Election Results, 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_elections.htm; Leip, supra note 242. 
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Francisco’s vote.247  Those familiar with San Francisco’s 
geography will know that this shift in partisanship did not result 
from population growth (there is nowhere to add population).  In 
fact, between 1960 and 2000, the total population in San 
Francisco County increased by just 4.9%; during this period, the 
statewide population increased by 115.5%.248  Thus, this change 
must have resulted from geographic sorting; specifically, an 
influx of Democrats and outflow of Republicans. 
Neighboring counties Los Angeles and Kern provide striking 
examples of the divergence of growing populations, as one 
neighbor broke Democratic while the other Republican.  Figures 
6 and 7 chart these results: 
FIGURE 6249 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 247 See Leip, supra note 242. 
 248 See California Historic & Projected Growth 1790 to 2030, NEGATIVE  
POPULATION GROWTH, http://www.npg.org/states/ca.htm; San Francisco Population, 
SFGENEOLOGY.COM, http://www.sfgenealogy.com/sf/history/hgpop.htm. 
 249 CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, Statewide Election Results, 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_elections.htm; Leip, supra note 242. 
Do Not Delete 3/16/2011 4:50 PM 
2011] The Red and Blue Golden State 349 
FIGURE 7250 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From 1948 until 1984, Los Angeles County oscillated 
between supporting Republican and Democratic presidential 
candidates.  Then, in 1988 it supported the Democratic nominee, 
and it has continued to do so since then by increasing margins.  
In Kern County, support for Democratic and Republican 
nominees stayed fairly close through 1976.  Then, as in Los 
Angeles, the margin of support started to diverge, but in this 
instance in favor of Republicans.  Moreover, unlike San 
Francisco, which had a relatively stable population from 1960 
through 2000, both Los Angeles and Kern experienced significant 
growth.  During this period, Los Angeles grew by 57.6%, while 
Kern grew by 126.6%.251 
This analysis focused on the trends evident in particular 
counties.  The effects of this sorting are apparent, however, 
throughout the state.  Beginning in 1948, sixteen general election 
contests (excluding propositions) had extremely close votes 
statewide; the final margins between the top two candidates were 
less than two percentage points.252  These close statewide results, 
however, mask the sorting occurring at the local level.  Figure 8 
 
 250 CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, Statewide Election Results, 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_elections.htm; Leip, supra note 242. 
 251 Los Angeles County Population Growth, CENSUSSCOPE, 
http://www.censusscope.org/us/s6/c37/chart_popl.html; Kern County Population Growth, 
CENSUSSCOPE, http://www.censusscope.org/us/s6/c29/chart_popl.html. 
 252 The Appendix lists these specific elections and the distribution of votes by county 
by margin of victory. 
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presents the average percentage of votes cast by decade in 
landslide and “toss-up” counties in these narrowly-decided 
statewide elections:253 
FIGURE 8254 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 illustrates the diverging trends in California.  In 
the 1940s, 73.5% of California’s votes were cast in counties in 
which the statewide vote differential between the top two 
candidates was less than two percentage points.  Only 9.9% of 
the vote came from counties decided by landslide margins—at 
least twenty percentage points.  Thus, three-quarters of 
Californians lived in counties with nearly equal populations of 
Democrats and Republicans.  Starting in the 1980s, however, in 
these narrow statewide elections more Californians cast their 
votes in landslide counties than in toss-up counties.  This trend 
has continued, so that in the 2000s less than ten percent of the 
votes came from toss-up counties, while more than one-quarter 
were cast in landslide counties. 
Although the analysis of twenty percent landslide counties 
demonstrates the growth of politically extreme counties, political 
scientists recognize that a differential of ten percent or less 
defines marginal contests.255  Thus, we could use ten percent as 
 
 253 A “landslide” election refers to a contest in which the winner receives at least sixty 
percent of the vote. ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, THE KEYS TO THE WHITE HOUSE: A SUREFIRE 
GUIDE TO PREDICTING THE NEXT PRESIDENT 26 (2000).  A “toss-up” election is an election 
in which the winning candidate prevails by less than five percent of the total vote. 
 254 See infra Appendix & note 353. 
 255 James E. Campbell, The Stagnation of Congressional Elections, in LIFE AFTER 
REFORM: WHEN THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT MEETS POLITICS 141, 142 
(Michael J. Malbin ed., 2003). 
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the cutoff to examine noncompetitive counties.  When we do so, 
we see some interesting changes: 
FIGURE 9256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not surprisingly, more voters live in ten percent 
noncompetitive counties than live in twenty percent landslide 
counties.  Accordingly, the votes in noncompetitive counties 
basically draw even with the votes in toss-up counties by the 
1960s and 1970s.  The main difference, though, between Figures 
8 and 9 is the magnitude in jump after the 1970s in the 
population in noncompetitive counties.  By the 2000s, nearly 
ninety percent of votes in a statewide toss-up election were cast 
by voters who lived in counties decided by at least ten percent, or 
noncompetitive margins.  Conversely, less than ten percent of the 
state’s voters lived in marginally competitive counties, even 
when the election was a toss-up. 
These changes probably did not result solely from population 
movement.  It is more likely that group dynamics pushed group 
members to greater extremes as one group or another became 
dominant in a county.257  Sociologists have studied group 
dynamics and the effects of group homogeneity on behavior.  
They have found that heterogeneous groups tend to be more 
moderate; the differences within the group restrain group 
excesses.258  Groups of homogenous persons, conversely, tend to 
 
 256 See infra Appendix & note 353. 
  257 BISHOP, supra note 233, at 68. 
 258 Id. 
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move toward polarization.259  Group polarization occurs as 
homogenous groups discuss issues.  Over time group members 
predictably move and coalesce, not toward a middle position, but 
toward a more extreme position than that held by the members 
initially.260  Continued dialog actually decreases variance among 
members and produces convergence on a relatively more extreme 
position.261  This result occurs for two reasons.  First, individuals 
seek acceptance, and so they adjust their position to conform to 
the dominant perspective of the group.262  Second, with a 
relatively homogenous group, contrary positions are rarely 
considered, so the dominant perspective naturally becomes more 
convincing.263 
Pervasive evidence demonstrates that group polarization 
theory extends to issues that bear directly on politics and 
political behavior.264  When applied to political dynamics, 
homogeneous groups similarly become self-reinforcing.  For 
instance, in landslide counties, political minorities participate 
less throughout the political process, from volunteering to 
voting.265  As minorities retreat, the majority gains confidence in 
its positions and becomes more extreme.266 
What are the implications of this population sorting for 
California’s redistricting reform?  Critics of legislative re-
districting charge that the Legislature draws noncompetitive 
districts that favor one party over the other.267  This is a 
comforting hypothesis since it provides a readily-curable cause: 
legislators redrawing their own lines and thus choosing their 
voters, for an effect: the rise in noncompetitive districts.  Even 
better, not only does it have a cause, it identifies the “bad guys” 
who perpetrated it, and what better bad guys could one suggest 
 
 259 “Polarization,” in this context, occurs when the tendency of individual members of 
a group to lean toward a given position is enhanced after discussion or other exchanges.  
As a result, groups often make more extreme decisions than would the typical average 
individual in the group. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to 
Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 85 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?]. 
 260 Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization 9 (John M. Olin Law & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 91, 1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, The Law]. 
 261 Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?, supra note 259, at 85–86. 
 262 Id. 
 263 Sunstein, The Law, supra note 260, at 10. 
 264 Edward L. Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Extremism and Social Learning, 1 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 263, 269 (2009). 
 265 BISHOP, supra note 233, at 73. 
 266 Id. at 77.  Not only do group dynamics relate to the decline in competitiveness in 
districts, they also help explain the rise in partisanship and the decline in moderation in 
legislatures.  Studies at the national level have found that members of Congress from all 
regions have moved away from the center, and since the 1980s voters have become vastly 
more partisan. Id. at 246, 253. 
 267 Id. at 28–29. 
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than politicians?268  The hypothesis also has victims—besides the 
electorate generally, the centrists who otherwise would send 
moderate candidates to the Legislature.269  During the past two 
decades, however, county lines—which have not changed—have 
come to define highly-partisan enclaves.  Although the line 
drawers decide the final district configurations, geographies 
underlying the districts have become more partisan anyway.  
Blaming legislators for the lack of competition may be appealing, 
but it ignores underlying realities.270 
Other analyses confirm that the ability of line drawers to 
create competitive districts in California is limited.  Cain et al. 
found that California’s geography constrains the ability to draw 
competitive districts.  When they instructed their map drawers to 
develop their random box plans (applying only equal population 
and compactness as constraints), fifty-three of the eighty 
assembly seats (66.3%) were unlikely to be even potentially 
competitive.271  In other words, before taking into account any 
other criteria, which will necessarily reduce competition further, 
two-thirds of California’s assembly districts will be 
noncompetitive.272 
The Center for Governmental Studies (Center), which helped 
to draft Proposition 11 and which supported the measure, 
acknowledged that increasing competition in California would be 
difficult.273  In addition to the concentrations of urban Democrats, 
Republicans predominate in large regions of the state, notably 
the Central Valley and much of Orange and Riverside 
Counties.274  The Center noted that imposing competitiveness as 
a redistricting criterion would require stretching districts from 
areas dominated by one party to those controlled by the other 
party.275  Even if this were possible, such practices likely would 
violate other considerations, such as the compactness of districts 
 
 268 Id. at 29. 
 269 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 189, at 2380. 
 270 BISHOP, supra note 233, at 29. 
 271 CAIN ET AL., supra note 224, at 16–17.  For these plans, they instructed their map 
drawers to ignore all other federal and state criteria.  The map drawers constructed four 
plans, and Cain et al. averaged the results of these plans. Id. 
 272 The “random box” plans also illustrate another consequence of California’s 
geography.  Because of the large urban concentrations of Democrats in the San Francisco 
and Los Angeles metropolitan areas, anything other than a heavily-biased Republican 
gerrymander will result in a Democratic majority. Id. at 4.  For instance, of the fifty-three 
safe assembly districts in the “random box” plans, forty (75.5%) were safe Democratic 
seats. Id. at 13.  These safe-Democratic districts constitute half of the Assembly’s eighty 
districts. 
 273 CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 127, at 27. 
 274 Id. 
 275 Id. 
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and the preservation of subjurisdictions and communities of 
interest.276 
Plotting results from the recent statewide election shows the 
problem that this sorting creates for drawing competitive 
districts in California.  The 2010 contest for state controller was 
decided by less than one percentage point.  Specifically, Harris, 
the Democratic candidate, defeated Cooley, the Republican 
candidate, by 0.6% of the vote.  The results of this election, 
presented graphically in Figure 10, illustrate the geographic 
separation in California. 
FIGURE 10277 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 276 Cain et al. required their mappers to draw “fully balanced” plans which considered 
equal population, the Voting Rights Act, compactness, minimizing subjurisdictional splits, 
and maximizing the number of potentially competitive districts.  This reduced the number 
of potentially competitive districts from an average of seventeen in their “random box” 
plans to fifteen in their “fully balanced” plans. CAIN ET AL., supra note 224, at 16–18.  
However, they define competitiveness as a thirteen-point range in voter registration, from 
a three percent Republican advantage to a ten percent Republican advantage.  If the 
range is considered to be only three percent Republican or Democratic advantage, then 
the number of competitive districts falls to seven. Id. at 19.  Even these numbers are not 
absolutes. Cain et al. acknowledged that these plans were not sufficiently legally polished 
to submit as actual proposals and that additional modifications might be necessary. Id. at 
24–25. 
 277 CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: 2002 CONTROLLER (2002) 
[hereinafter STATEMENT OF VOTE: CONTROLLER 2002], available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/ 
elections/sov/2008_general/sov_complete.pdf. 
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Figure 10 illustrates that one continuous bloc of counties 
supported the Democratic candidate, while another bloc 
supported the Republican candidate.  Of California’s fifty-eight 
counties, only three (Alpine, Imperial, and Los Angeles) were not 
part of one of these two blocs.  In the thirty-nine contiguous 
counties that supported Cooley, he won by a combined margin of 
18.6% of the vote.  In the sixteen contiguous counties that 
supported Harris, the Democrat won by a combined differential 
of 26.4%; in the three noncontiguous counties, her combined 
margin was 14.1%.278  Furthermore, only seven of the state’s 
counties were marginally competitive (differential between the 
top two candidates of less than ten percent).  These seven 
counties accounted for only 7.7% of the state’s total votes.279 
This analysis illustrates the difficulty that line drawers will 
have in crafting competitive districts.  Because of the geographic 
sorting that has occurred, most areas in California are highly 
partisan.  Redistricters can draw competitive districts only by 
crossing city and county lines to combine different types of 
communities.280  In areas of political segregation, no commission 
can draw competitive districts.281  Furthermore, the 
requirements of the Voting Rights Act will further constrain the 
commission’s ability to draw competitive districts.  Thus, the 
commission can fulfill the promises of Proposition 11’s supporters 
only by violating the only standards that the measure actually 
articulates. 
V.  NONCOMPETITIVENESS:  CAN REDISTRICTERS PROVIDE  
THE CURE? 
The competitiveness of districts has declined, but geographic 
patterns appear to play a major role in this development.  Can a 
change in the persons redrawing the lines alter this outcome? 
To determine whether commission-controlled redistricting 
enhances competitiveness, Jamie Carson and Michael H. Crespin 
analyzed the results from the four Congressional redistricting 
cycles occurring between 1972 and 2002.282  Carson and Crespin 
concluded that legislative redistricting is more likely to lead to 
 
 278 Id. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Recent Developments, supra note 212, at 542. 
 281 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 189, at 2381. 
 282 See generally Jamie Carson & Michael H. Crespin, Comparing the Effects of 
Legislative, Commission, and Judicial Redistricting Plans on U.S. House Elections, 1972–
2002 (Mar. 11–13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript prepared for presentation at the 
Western Political Science Association Annual Meeting), available at 
http://www.commoncause.org/atf/cf/%7BFB3C17E2-CDD1-4DF6-92BE-BD4429893665% 
7D/PaperRedistrictingPoliticalCompetition.pdf. 
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the creation of noncompetitive districts than other procedures.  
Specifically, plans drawn by commissions, or the courts, tend to 
produce a greater level of competition than legislative-drawn 
plans.283  Seth Masket, Jonathan Winburn, and Gerald C. Wright 
looked at the competitiveness of state legislative districts.  They 
found some evidence that legislative redistricting resulted in less 
competitive elections when compared to elections in districts 
drawn by neutral commissions, especially in contests involving 
incumbents.284 
Although Masket et al. found that legislative redistricting 
created less competitive districts, another of their findings 
reinforces the geographic sorting hypothesis.  They examined the 
difference in votes by assembly districts in presidential elections.  
Figure 11 presents the average difference in vote by districts 
from 1976 through 2004: 
FIGURE 11285 
AVERAGE DIFFERENCE IN PRESIDENTIAL VOTE 
BY CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY DISTRICT 
1976–2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 283 Id. at 22.  Carson and Crespin further found, however, that partisan redistricting 
strategies for Congressional seats depend upon the party’s standing in Congress.  A party 
not in control of Congress will tend to use more aggressive strategies in state 
redistrictings in an attempt to take away seats from the other party.  Parties in control of 
Congress, however, are more likely to adopt conservative redistricting strategies to retain 
control. Id. at 22–23.  But, sometimes if a party cuts its margins too thin, these strategies 
can backfire.  For instance, in the 1980s, Indiana Republicans drew a plan that enabled 
their party to convert a 6-5 Democratic delegation to a 6-4 Republican advantage in 1982; 
by the end of the decade, the Democrats then reversed this to an 8-2 Democratic majority.  
More recently, a plan by Georgia Democrats intended to capture 7 of 13 seats resulted in 
securing only 5 seats. Lublin & McDonald, supra note 34, at 145. 
 284 Masket et al., supra note 218, at 17. 
 285 Id. at 38. 
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Figure 11 confirms that the vote differential increased after 
the legislative redistrictings of the 1980 and 2000 redistricting 
cycles.  On average, the increase was by slightly less than three 
percent after the redistrictings.  On the other hand, after the 
judicial redistricting in 1992, the differential declined by 
approximately one percent.  The greatest change in differentials 
occurred, however, not after redistricting, but during the middle 
of the decades.  In the 1970s, the differential increased by seven 
percent; in the 1990s, it rose by five percent (and was essentially 
flat during the 1980s).286  Alan I. Abramowitz, Brad Alexander, 
and Matthew Gunning similarly found that “[t]he most 
significant changes in competitiveness of [congressional contests] 
occurred between redistricting cycles.”287  Since the greatest 
decline in competitiveness occurred not after redistrictings, but 
between them, this suggests that the geographic sorting 
hypothesis better explains the decline. 
Fortunately, two states, Arizona and Washington, already 
require that their redistricting commissions consider 
competitiveness in developing plans.288  If self-interested 
redistricting, rather than geographic sorting, better explains the 
decline in competitiveness, we should expect the districts in these 
states to exhibit significantly greater competitiveness than those 
in California—they do not. 
 
 286 Id. 
 287 Alan I. Abramowitz et al., Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of 
Competition in U.S. House Elections, 68 J. OF POL. 75, 79 (2006).  Concerning the type of 
line drawer, they found “no evidence that redistricting by nonpartisan redistricting 
commissions or courts resulted in more competitive districts than redistricting by 
partisan state legislatures.”  The primary exception was California, in which marginal 
congressional districts declined from fourteen to four. Id. 
 288 Two other states contemplated proposals to require competitive election districts.  
In Colorado, State Senator Ken Gordon introduced a bill to add competitiveness to the 
criteria that the legislature must use when it draws political boundaries.  Eventually, 
however, these provisions were removed from the bill. Redistricting, COMMONCAUSE, 
http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=196481 (last visited Oct. 
25, 2010).  In November 2005, voters placed onto the Ohio ballot a proposition to reform 
its redistricting process. State Issue 4: Amended Certified Ballot Language, OHIO 
SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResultsMain/ 
2005ElectionsResults/05-1108Issue4/State%20Issue%204%20Amended%20Certified% 
20Ballot%20Language.aspx (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).  This measure, Ballot Issue 4, 
would have substituted judicial appointment of members in place of appointment by 
elected officials. Id.  More importantly, it would have required the commission to adopt 
the legislative and congressional plans—including any submitted by the public—that 
scored highest for competitiveness. Id.  The measure lost, however, 30.3% to 69.7%. State 
Issue 4: November 8, 2005, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/ 
elections/electResultsMain/2005ElectionsResults/05-1108Issue4.aspx (last visited Oct. 25, 
2010). 
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Washington State had originally required its Legislature to 
redraw the state’s districts.289  Of the first ten redistrictings after 
statehood in 1889, however, the Legislature successfully 
redistricted only four times; the remaining times, the lines were 
redrawn by either the courts or voter initiatives.290  Therefore, in 
1983, after the governor vetoed that decade’s redistricting bill, 
the Washington Legislature proposed and the voters approved 
Constitutional Amendment 74 to shift responsibility for 
redrawing the lines to a bipartisan commission.291  Pursuant to 
this amendment, the majority and minority leaders of the state 
Legislature each appoint one commissioner, and those four 
commissioners then appoint the remaining member.292  The 
commission then submits its plans to the Legislature, which may 
alter the lines, but only after approval from two-thirds of the 
Legislature.293 
As amended, Washington law delineates particular 
standards for the commission to follow in redrawing the lines.  
Washington law divides the state into forty-nine legislative 
districts.  Each district elects one state senator and two members 
of the state house of representatives, who run for numbered 
posts.294  Legislative districts must have equal population.295  In 
addition, to the extent possible, districts should minimize splits 
of subjurisdictions and be compact and contiguous.296  Finally, 
the commission must “encourage electoral competition.”297 
Much was made of the apparent success of the commission in 
bringing change to the state’s congressional delegation.  Indeed, 
prior to the 1992 redistricting, the delegation’s members had 
 
 289  Redistricting Facts, WASH. STATE REDISTRICTING COMM’N, 
http://www.redistricting.wa.gov/pages/facts.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
 290 Herb Robinson, Still Political, But Better Than Before, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 19, 
1990, at A8.  The state had many colorful incidents in its history.  Among labels applied to 
parts of plans were the “Kiskaddon Pimple,” which described the addition of a single 
Snohomish County precinct—which included an incumbent’s residence—into an otherwise 
all-King County district defined by a straight boundary with the exception of the precinct, 
and the “Rasmussen Stovepipe,” a narrow corridor connecting Democratic incumbent 
senator Rasmussen’s home to the Republican Lakewood area. Neil Modie, Compromise Is 
the Key in Political Redistricting, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 19, 2001, at A7.  
Another plan submitted by activists, which would have placed eight incumbents into a 
single district was described as the “legislative equivalent of the Texas Chainsaw 
Massacre.” Shelby Scates, Trying to Slay the Gerrymander, SEATTLE POST 
INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 22, 1991, at F2. 
 291 David Ammons, Citizen Panel Will Redraw State’s Political Boundaries, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1990, at D4. 
 292 WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43, cl. 2. 
 293 WASH. REV. CODE ANN, § 44.05.100(1)–(2) (West 2007). 
 294 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.05.090(4) (West 2007). 
 295 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.05.090(1) (West 2007). 
 296 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.05.090(2) (West 2007). 
 297 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.05.090(5) (West 2007). 
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served an average of six terms in office.  By 1994, the members 
averaged two terms.298  Table 4 tracks the changes in the party 
control of seats from the election, before the implementation of 
the commission’s first plan to the present: 
TABLE 4299 
WASHINGTON CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION  
1990–2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Table 4 shows, in the first election under the 1992 plan, 
Democrats won three new seats, two from Republicans and one 
as a result of the state receiving an additional seat through 
reapportionment.  Two years later, the Republicans took six seats 
from the Democrats.  Over the next three elections, the 
Democrats won back four of those seats.  Thus, during the five 
elections under this plan, incumbents lost seven elections and 
seats changed party hands twelve times.300  Elections under the 
 
 298 Louis Jacobson & Chris Cillizza, Taking Redistricting out of Lawmakers’ Hands, 
NAT’L J., Mar. 10, 2001, at 728. 
 299 United States Congressional Delegations from Washington, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_congressional_delegations_from_Washington 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2010). 
 300 A closer analysis suggests that the turnover occurring in the 1992 plan may have 
resulted from national trends rather than any inherent competitiveness of the districts in 
the plan.  Eight of the twelve seats that changed party hands under the 1992 plan did so 
in either the 1992 or 1994 elections.  1992 saw the defeat of Republican George H. W. 
Bush by Democrat Bill Clinton; the following election involved “the Republican tidal wave 
of 1994,” in which Republicans won more than fifty congressional seats, including that of 
then-House Speaker Tom Foley of Washington. Rhodes Cook, Hamstrung by Health Care? 
Two Ways to Lose a House Majority, U. VA. CENTER FOR POL. (Mar. 25, 2010), 
http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/frc2010032501/. 
Democrats Republicans
1990 5 3
1992 8 1
1994 2 7
1996 3 6
1998 5 4
2000 6 3
2002 6 3
2004 6 3
2006 6 3
2008 6 3
2010 5 4
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2002 redistricting plan, however, were a different matter.  Only 
one seat changed parties under this plan. 
Despite the use of a bipartisan commission that needed to 
comply with a specific competitiveness requirement, 
Washington’s 2002 redistricting mirrored that of California.  
Much like the “incumbent protection gerrymander” passed by the 
California Legislature, the Washington bipartisan commission 
developed its own “status-quo plan.”301  As one of the members of 
the Redistricting Commission conceded, state legislative districts 
“tended to become slightly more Democratic if two or all three of 
their incumbent lawmakers were Democrats, and slightly more 
Republican if two or three incumbents were Republican.”302  In 
other words, the districts became less competitive. 
An analysis of the Washington congressional and legislative 
districts reveals the dearth of competition under its 2002 status 
quo plan.  Table 5 graphically presents the average margin of 
victory in the districts that the commission drew: 
TABLE 5303 
AVERAGE MARGIN OF VICTORY, WASHINGTON 
CONGRESSIONAL, STATE SENATE, AND STATE 
REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICTS 
1992–2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 301 David Ammons, Citizen Commission Approves a New Map of Congressional 
Districts, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 2, 2002, B1. 
 302 Neil Modie, Tale of 2 Legislators—and One District, SEATTLE POST 
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 22, 2002, at B6, available at http://www.seattlepi.com/local/55337_ 
redistrict22.shtml. 
 303 See WASHINGTON SECRETARY OF STATE, Previous Elections, 
http://wei.secstate.wa.gov/osos/en/PreviousElections/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 
7, 2011). 
U.S. Representative State senator State representative
1992 19.8 23.0 29.2
1994 16.8 34.7 34.8
1996 17.4 31.6 31.1
1998 28.1 47.2 43.0
2000 23.8 40.8 35.8
2002 26.0 54.6 42.2
2004 28.7 30.3 36.8
2006 29.1 44.3 48.2
2008 31.4 43.0 37.7
2010 20.2 40.8 35.7
Average 24.6 40.8 38.4
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As Table 5 illustrates, from 1992 to 2008, the lowest average 
margin of victory in an election in districts drawn by the 
commission was almost 17%.  In six of ten election cycles, the 
average margin of victory in general elections for state senate 
seats exceeded 40%.  Overall, the average margins of victory 
under the commission’s plans were 24.6% in congressional 
contests, 40.8% in state senate races, and 38.4% in state 
representative elections. 
Because a large number of state senate and legislative 
districts were so uncompetitive that candidates ran uncontested, 
these contests skew the average victory margin upward.  
Therefore, the next three charts present the distribution of 
contests by range of margin of victory: less than five percent, 
between five and ten percent, greater than ten percent, and 
uncontested (no congressional races were uncontested): 
FIGURE 12304 
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FIGURE 13305 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 14306 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These distributions also make apparent the increase in 
uncontested (presumably extremely safe) seats after the January 
2002 “status quo” plan.  Furthermore, despite the imposition of a 
competitiveness requirement, in seven of nine years for state 
senator and six of nine years for state representative, the number 
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of uncontested elections actually exceeded the number of toss-up 
elections. 
Arizona provides a second example of a state that includes a 
competitiveness requirement.  In 2000, Arizona voters approved 
an initiative that mandated consideration of competitiveness as a 
criterion for redistricting.307  The measure, Proposition 106, 
mandates creation of a five-member Independent Redistricting 
Commission (IRC) to perform the redistricting.  Arizona’s 
Commission on Appellate Court Appointments nominates 
candidates.308  The majority and minority leaders of the state 
senate and house each then appoint one commissioner.309  Next, 
the four commissioners appoint the fifth member, who serves as 
the chair.310  No more than two members may be from the same 
political party.311  The Arizona Constitution requires this 
commission to redistrict the state’s congressional and legislative 
districts.312 
As amended, the Arizona Constitution requires the 
commission to develop initial districts of equal population in a 
grid-like pattern.  In the next phase, the commission makes 
adjustments as necessary to accommodate the six goals identified 
by Proposition 106 (equal population, Voting Rights Act 
compliance, compactness and contiguity, respect for communities 
of interest, geographic features and jurisdiction boundaries, and 
competitiveness).313  In the remaining two constitutionally-
mandated phases, the commission receives comments on its plan 
and makes final adjustments.314 
The commission’s approval of a final plan in 2002 sparked 
litigation that did not conclude until a ruling by the Arizona 
Supreme Court seven years later.  Concerning competitiveness, 
the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the Arizona 
 
 307 Ronald J. Hansen, 2000 Redistricting Goal of Closer Elections Unmet, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Jul. 8, 2010, at A1. 
 308 ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(4)–(9). 
 309 Id. 
 310 Id. 
 311 ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(3). 
 312 ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14).  Although Arizona also uses districts to elect the 
members of its state house, each district elects two representatives, the top two vote 
getters. ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(1).  Accordingly, elections for the state house are not 
included in this analysis. 
 313 ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14). 
 314 ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14)–(16).  Since Proposition 106 passed in 2000, the 
commission has been formed and drawn districts only in conjunction with the post-2000 
Census round of redistricting.  Despite the terms of the constitutional mandate, the 
commission did not actually adjust for competitiveness until after receiving comments. 
Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Comm’n, 208 P.3d 676, 681 (Ariz. 2009). 
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Constitution, as amended by Proposition 106, required that the 
IRC create “more competitive districts to the extent practicable 
when doing so does not cause significant detriment to the other 
goals.”315 
Despite this goal of creating more competitive districts, the 
chair of the IRC conceded that most Arizonans would consider 
the commission’s work in this regard to be “an abject failure.”316  
He elaborated, “If your goal is competitive districts, I don’t think 
this helps you get down that road very far.”317  In an analysis of 
the commission system, The Arizona Republic concluded that the 
commission “failed to meet a primary goal of making legislative 
elections more competitive.”318 
Analyses of the elections in the IRC’s districts support these 
conclusions and suggest again that geographic sorting cannot be 
overcome, even when governing law specifically instructs map 
drawers to do so.  Despite the IRC’s charge to craft competitive 
districts, the resulting districts were anything but.  Table 6 
illustrates the average margin of victory in the districts that the 
commission drew: 
TABLE 6319 
AVERAGE MARGIN OF VICTORY, 
ARIZONA CONGRESSIONAL AND STATE SENATE 
DISTRICTS 
2002–2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 shows that the average margin of victory in districts 
drawn by the IRC approached thirty percent.  Specifically, the 
average victory margin in general elections in congressional 
districts was 26.9%.  For state senate contests, Table 6 shows 
 
 315 Arizona Minority Coalition, 208 P.3d at 687. 
 316 Hansen, supra note 307. 
 317 Eli Rosenbaum, Redistrict Reform’s Dead End, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2005, at A23. 
 318 Hansen, supra note 307. 
 319 See Previous Arizona Elections, ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE, 
http://www.azsos.gov/election/PreviousYears.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2011). 
U.S. representative State senator
2002 26.8 64.8
2004 40.1 62.3
2006 26.8 40.1
2008 22.7 44.2
2010 18.0 46.6
Average 26.9 51.6
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that the average margin of victory was 51.6%. 
As with the Washington legislative elections, the large 
number of uncontested seats distorts these numbers.  Therefore, 
Figures 15 and 16 reflect the ranges in which these contests fell: 
FIGURE 15320 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 16321 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As with Washington’s elections, the vast majority of 
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Arizona’s districts were decided by margins that exceeded ten 
percent.  Of the 150 state senate contests over eight years in the 
“competitive” districts crafted by the IRC, only eighteen had 
margins below ten percent, and only four of those fell within five 
percent.  Furthermore, in nearly one-third (forty-seven) of these 
contests, the winner did not face an opponent in the general 
election. 
Why was the commission incapable of drawing competitive 
districts?  Professor Michael McDonald, who worked as a 
consultant with the commission, noted that the state’s 
redistricting requirements (similar to those of California except 
for the addition of competitiveness) prevented the creation of 
many competitive districts.322  The commission’s chair pointed to 
the Voting Rights Act’s protection of minorities and their 
tendency to vote Democratic, and, echoing the findings of Cain et 
al., the IRC chair noted that the resulting concentration of 
Democrats in a small number of districts left few Democrats with 
which to make the remaining districts competitive.323 
What do the experiences of Washington and Arizona  
suggest for California?  Because of Arizona’s sizeable minority 
population, redistricters’ hands were tied when trying to draw 
competitive districts.324  California, however, has a much larger 
minority population than does the Grand Canyon State.325  To 
the extent demographics limited the competitiveness of Arizona’s 
districts, California’s redistricters will surely find their hands 
even more tightly bound by their own state’s demographics. 
Washington, however, had a proportionately smaller 
minority population than either Arizona or California had.326  
Nevertheless, its commission did not craft significantly 
competitive districts.  Instead, it chose to develop a “status quo” 
plan.  More than anything else, this experience confirms that 
commissions, be they purportedly bipartisan or nonpartisan, are 
no more insulated from political considerations than is the 
Legislature.327  Washington’s Redistricting Commission’s five 
 
 322 Hansen, supra note 307. 
 323 Id. 
 324 Profile of General Demographic Characteristics, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTSubjectShowTablesServlet?_lang=en&_ts=3133325
16005 (select table “DP-1”;; then click “Show Result”) (last visited Jan. 16, 2011). 
 325 According to the 2000 Census, 63.8% of Arizona’s population was non-Latino 
white, whereas only 46.7% of California’s population was non-Latino white. Id. 
 326 The 2000 Census found that 78.9% of the Washington’s population was non-Latino 
white. Id. 
 327 Christopher C. Confer, To Be About the People’s Business: An Examination of the 
Utility of Nonpolitical/Bipartisan Legislative Redistricting Commissions, 13 KAN. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 115, 125 (2004). 
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members could not agree on redistricting plans.  After missing 
the statutory deadline,328 the members eventually agreed to 
make only minimal changes to the previous plan to adjust for 
population shifts during the past decade.  In the end, the only 
conclusion to which they could all agree was to sacrifice 
competitiveness.329 
VI.  IS PROPOSITION 11’S REDISTRICTING COMMISSION THE BEST 
MEANS TO REDRAW CALIFORNIA’S LINES? 
Will Proposition 11’s Citizens Redistricting Commission be 
able to draw more competitive districts?  Arizona and 
Washington, states which have imposed competitiveness goals on 
their redistricting commissions, have had little success in 
achieving competitiveness.  Since California has not statutorily 
included competitiveness among its requirements,330 the 
likelihood of California’s commission achieving significant 
competitiveness in the state’s districts is minimal.  
Demographics331 and federal law332 will work against the 
commission.  Arizona and Washington, states with pre-
dominantly white populations, needed to concentrate few of their 
minority (and typically Democratic) voters into districts to 
comply with the Voting Rights Act.  Nevertheless, few of those 
state’s districts are competitive.333  California’s majority-minority 
population, however, necessitates the drawing of  
numerous majority-minority, heavily-Democratic districts.334  
This concentration of Democratic voters, along with the 
population’s geographic sorting, will render the drawing of a 
significant number of competitive districts quite difficult. 
If the commission will not be effective, might it actually be a 
step back?  Some of the differences between independent 
commissions and the Legislature may make the CRC the less 
desirable body to redistrict the state. 
 
 328 The Washington legislature needed to pass a law retroactively changing the 
statutory deadline after the commission could not approve a congressional plan until more 
than two weeks after the required date. David Ammons, Lawmakers to Rescue New 
Districts, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 10, 2002, at B5. 
 329 This is an example of the problem of the “bipartisan gerrymander.”  A “bipartisan 
commission,” with equal representation for both major parties, tends not to result in a 
nonpartisan result, but rather a bipartisan one.  Desiring to avoid gridlock, 
commissioners draw a map that is acceptable to both sides.  As with the 2002 California 
legislative redistricting and the 2002 commission redistrictings in Arizona and 
Washington, rather than draw competitive districts, such plans primarily strengthen the 
partisan district majorities already in place. Rosenbaum, supra note 317. 
 330 See supra note 171. 
 331 See supra text accompanying notes 233–275. 
 332 See supra text accompanying notes 220–232. 
 333 See supra text accompanying notes 302–305, 319–321. 
 334 See supra text accompanying notes 226–230. 
Do Not Delete 3/16/2011 4:50 PM 
368 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 14:311 
One of the primary arguments for adopting a commission 
was to take redistricting away from the self-interested 
Legislature.335  The Legislature may have a vested interest in the 
outcome, but it also has more relevant knowledge and 
experience.  Legislators are extremely familiar with their 
districts, their constituents, and their needs, and they usually 
have a better understanding of these concerns than do 
outsiders.336  Legislators are thus best able to tailor districts to 
represent constituent communities and their interests.337  
Nathaniel Persily experienced this firsthand when he assisted 
courts in drawing redistricting plans for New York and 
Maryland.  In one instance, he moved an uninhabited swamp 
from one district to another.  Since this was uninhabited 
swampland, a person unfamiliar with the district, such as 
Persily, would justifiably have thought that such a move would 
have no redistricting consequences (since it had no population) 
and no political consequences (since the land had little value).  A 
legislator informed Persily, however, that this shift would 
disrupt environmental projects that the legislator initiated and 
hoped to complete.  Thus, a move that would have no apparent 
political effect had tangible policy consequences: persons 
unfamiliar with the district would not be able to incorporate this 
concern.338 
Furthermore, the elected nature of legislators, rather than 
rendering them less qualified, actually makes legislators better 
suited to make the choices required by redistricting.  The remap 
process inherently involves tradeoffs among numerous 
communities, constituent interests, and policies.339  Redistricting 
“involves give and take in resolving conflicts among the various 
standards and in considering the concerns, desires, and 
objections of numerous interested persons and groups.”340  Line 
drawers also make decisions about service relationships between 
representatives and constituents and their placement within 
larger policy programs or decisions.341  Legislators routinely 
balance complicated policy choices and, as elected 
 
 335 See supra text accompanying notes 33–36. 
 336 Interview of Dr. Shauna Reilly, (Jan. 27, 2010), at 1:1-10 (on file with author). 
 337 Justin Levitt & Bethany Foster, A Citizen’s Guide to Redistricting, BRENNAN 
CENTER FOR JUSTICE 23 (2008), http://brennan.3cdn.net/58180b7e66ce3d66bb_ 
5sm6bvr97.pdf. 
 338 Persily, supra note 205, at 678 nn.94–95.  Persily also found that line drawers who 
are unfamiliar with local communities are more likely to draw district boundaries 
coterminous to subjurisdiction boundaries even when the actual communities of interest 
extend beyond those lines. Id. at 678. 
 339 Brunell & Buchler, supra note 199, at 448–49. 
 340 Nadler v. Schwarzenegger, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 92, 100 (2006). 
 341 Persily, supra note 205, at 679. 
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representatives, are particularly qualified to do so.342  The 
Supreme Court has recognized that legislatures exercise political 
judgment in balancing competing interests,343 and that 
legislatures are the institutions “best situated to identify and 
then reconcile traditional state policies” within the redistricting 
framework.344  In contrast to legislatively-controlled redistricting, 
an appointed commission not only empowers less experienced 
persons to make these tradeoffs, but the commissioners also lack 
the accountability for their actions that legislators must confront 
with each election.345 
Legislative redistricting does have significant advantages.  
Moreover, legal and demographic hurdles will prevent the CRC 
from achieving its objective of significantly increasing the 
competitiveness of California’s districts. 
VII.  KEEPING THE COMMISSION AND RETURNING REDISTRICTING 
TO THE LEGISLATURE—BUT WITH A TWIST 
Because of the Legislature’s knowledge regarding factors 
that are relevant to the formulation of districts, as well as its 
experience in balancing interests, it is the appropriate body to 
draw the redistricting plan.  An independent commission, 
however, could still serve a useful function in the redistricting 
process. 
The commission could review the plan developed by the 
Legislature and propose changes.  To add teeth to its 
recommendations, California law should give deference to the 
commission’s proposals. 
An independent commission is better suited to review a 
redistricting plan, rather than to create it.  Because of 
commission members’ lack of familiarity with the communities 
and the government’s relationship to them, they will benefit by 
having additional time to get up to speed and by observing the 
Legislature’s redistricting hearings and decisions.  Once the 
 
 342 Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of 
Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 697 (2006). 
 343 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995). 
 344 Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414–15 (1977). 
 345 Kang, supra note 342, at 690.  Critics also question whether an appointed body 
can be representative of as diverse a population as that of California.  This argument was 
particularly powerful in helping defeat Proposition 77 and its redistricting commission of 
three retired judges. Huefner, supra note 115, at 40–41.  Although opponents of 
Proposition 11 raised this point, it obviously did not carry the day.  Nevertheless, as of 
this writing, the application period for the Citizens Redistricting Commission has closed, 
and only 11,000 of the 30,000 applicants are from minority candidates. Malcolm 
Maclachlan, Group Effort Pushed Minority Outreach for Redistricting Commission, 
CAPITOL WKLY., Feb. 25, 2010, at A1. 
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Legislature has completed its plans, the commission could then 
review those lines.  Their review could proceed at three levels: 
(1) Overall architecture—this would look at the overall 
demographics of the plan.  The commission would compare the 
share of registered voters in each major party and the racial and 
ethnic percentages of the statewide and regional population and 
compare them to the anticipated totals for the proposed plans.  
The objective of this review is to ensure that no groups are 
especially over- or under-represented at the statewide level.  An 
example of a plan that would cause the commission concern 
would be the 2002 Ohio redistricting plans, in which Republicans 
controlled 61.6% of the seats even though they represented only 
49.0% of the state’s registered voters.346 
(2) Review of specific districts—the commission would review 
the configuration of specific districts for irregularities.  Concerns 
here would include unnecessary splitting of communities of 
interests and sub-jurisdictions, lack of compactness, irregular 
district shapes, combination of dissimilar communities, and other 
anomalies. 
(3) A consideration of specific lines—this would focus on 
specific streets and geographic features that the plan uses to 
form districts.  Practices that the commission addresses here 
might include the “Kiskaddon Pimple” and the “Rasmussen 
Stovepipe” from the Washington plans—situations where the 
overall district configuration is acceptable but a particular 
district’s exclusion or inclusion of a few blocks lacks 
justification.347 
To assist its review, the commission would consider public 
testimony provided to the Legislature and the complete record of 
its deliberations.  It could also convene its own hearings to 
receive public comment about the Legislature’s plans, which 
would help to direct the commission’s attention.  After concluding 
its review, the commission would submit to the Legislature 
written comments concerning the acceptability of its plan. 
To encourage the Legislature to adopt the commission’s 
recommendations, the deference that courts normally apply to 
the Legislature’s plans should instead shift to the commission’s 
 
 346 Joe Hallett, Redistricting Comes Under Scrutiny, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 27, 
2005, at A1.  Not only did Ohio’s plans create a disparity between party registration and 
electoral success, but its plans caused excessive noncompetitiveness in its districts.  In the 
election immediately preceding Issue 4, the state’s redistricting measure, the mean 
margin of victory in Ohio’s 133 congressional and state legislative districts was forty-two 
percent. Id. 
 347 Modie, supra note 290. 
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work.  As discussed previously, prior to the adoption of 
Proposition 11, California law mandated that the Legislature 
redistrict the state.348  Under that process, the courts held that 
California law entitled the Legislature’s determinations to great 
deference as long as they constituted reasonable applications of 
controlling state and federal law.  Courts extended such 
deference even when equally reasonable alternatives might be 
available.349  Courts deferred to the Legislature in the absence of 
a showing that it unmistakably violated a particular provision of 
the law.350  When considering a legislative redistricting, the court 
not only applied deference, but judicial restraint.351  For 
constitutional challenges to legislative redistrictings, courts have 
presumed that the plans were constitutional and placed the 
burden of proving a violation upon the challenger.352 
If the courts instead extend this deference to the conclusions 
of the reviewing commission, the Legislature would confront a 
choice.  It could modify its plan to be consistent with the 
comments of the commission, or it could decline to alter its plan.  
However, in any subsequent challenge on grounds raised by the 
commission, courts would defer to the commission’s 
recommendations as long as they were reasonable.  Thus, to 
defend its unaltered plan, the Legislature would need to 
overcome the deference extended to the commission’s 
recommendations. 
Two examples show the effectiveness of this change.  First, 
assume a commission had reviewed the Washington redistricting 
plan that contained the “Rasmussen Stovepipe.”  A reviewing 
commission might recommend that the narrow “Stovepipe” 
extension sliced through a community, combined dissimilar 
populations, and should be eliminated.  In future litigation, the 
Legislature would need to argue that such a recommendation 
was not reasonable.  In a second example, assume a commission 
had reviewed the Ohio redistricting plan and suggested that the 
Legislature modify it to balance more evenly the number of 
majority-Democratic and majority-Republican districts under the 
plan.  Remember that Republicans controlled sixty percent of the 
districts even though they held only a forty-nine percent to forty-
eight percent registration lead statewide.  Again, in any future 
 
 348 See supra Part I.A. 
 349 Nadler v. Schwarzenegger, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 92, 100–01 (2006). 
 350 Id. at 98. 
 351 Assembly v. Deukmejian, 639 P.2d 939, 958 (1982).  See also Easley v. Cromartie, 
532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (observing that caution is particularly appropriate where the 
legislature has “articulated a legitimate political explanation for its districting decision”). 
 352 Nadler, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 98. 
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litigation, the Legislature would need to explain why drawing a 
more balanced plan was not reasonable.  Conversely, if the 
commission recommends that a politically-balanced plan be tilted 
to favor one of the parties, the Legislature might be willing to 
contest in court the reasonableness of such a recommendation in 
a legal challenge to its plan. 
The establishment of a reviewing commission thus has 
several advantages.  First, it places upon the Legislature a 
tremendous burden to overcome if it decides not to adopt the 
commission’s recommendations.  Even if the Legislature believes 
its initial plan is justified, it must be able to establish that the 
commission’s alternative is not even reasonable.  Because of the 
high burden it must satisfy, counsel often will urge the 
Legislature to adopt the recommendations so as to retain control 
over the remap process.  A second advantage is that the 
Legislature retains responsibility for the initial architecture of 
the plan in the Legislature, the body that is most familiar with 
the pertinent representational considerations, the best able to 
begin the process quickly, and most accountable to the voters.  
This system, however, would provide a significant check on the 
Legislature.  Third, this system better utilizes the commission, 
allowing it more time to prepare and not demanding that it learn 
the minutiae of district representation, while providing a fuller 
record for its consideration.  Fourth, it allows the Legislature to 
retain its plan if it believes the recommendations of the 
commission are not reasonable.  Finally, it allows for public 
comment after the Legislature has developed its plan. 
CONCLUSION 
Proposition 11’s redistricting commission is unlikely to 
provide a significant change in the competitiveness of the state’s 
districts.  A better approach would leave redistricting in the 
hands of the body most experienced in performing the policy 
trade-offs required by the redistricting process.  A commission 
could be most helpful not in drawing lines, but in reviewing the 
maps developed by the Legislature. 
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APPENDIX353 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 353 See DAVID LEIP’S ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 
http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/index.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011); Statewide 
Election Results, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ 
elections_elections.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2011); United States Presidential Election in 
California, 1948, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_ 
election_in_California,_1948 (last visited Jan. 9, 2011).  The author’s calculations, based 
on data obtained from the above sources, are on file with the author. 
<5% >10% >20%
1948 President 0.5 73.5 24.5 9.9
1958 Lieutenant Governor 1.8 63.7 20.2 2.0
1958 Secretary of State 0.9 61.0 14.6 2.8
1958 Controller 0.6 60.7 14.8 1.2
1960 President 0.5 51.4 30.3 5.1
1966 Controller 1.0 6.5 41.1 10.4
1970 Attorney General 1.4 7.4 45.4 18.8
1976 President 1.8 55.5 28.8 8.7
1982 Governor 1.2 9.8 32.4 19.6
1986 Senator 1.4 16.5 75.2 20.7
1990 Attorney General 0.4 32.7 57.6 23.1
1994 Senator 1.9 7.5 90.7 40.4
1994 Secretary of State 0.5 6.3 87.3 21.4
1998 Secretary of State 1.1 0.7 81.9 26.3
2002 Controller 0.3 8.7 85.1 27.4
2010 Attorney General 0.6 5.8 92.3 32.4
Percent of Statewide Votes in 
Counties Decided by:Statewide 
Differential
